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Abstract: 
"This research explores the reconstruction of Georgian national identity after the Rose 
Revolution in November 2003, a time when new definitions of Georgian national ident1ty 
emerged. A~ the Rose Revolution was characterized by dynarnic 24 - hour media 
coverage, this research explores ways in which the media, mainly TV channel Rustavi 2, 
contributed to the formation and dissemination of dominant discourses of Georgian 
national identity. The methodological approach incorporates both a critical discourse 
analysis of a media archive and eleven semi-structured interviews to identify the 
dominant discourses on Georgian national identity flagged in the media, and to explore 
how interviewees of different ethnic origins negotiated these dominant discourses three 
years after the Rose Revolution. Results of this exploratory research suggest that 
throughout the media coverage of the Rose Revolution the main debate around Georgian 
national identity was its transition from "Old" to "New" Georgia, and the unit y of the 
Georgian people. To accentuate this discourse of unit y; the media approached national 
identity by excluding multiethnic reality of Georgia, and bringing forward Christianity 
and the unique Georgian culture as unifying factors. Discourse on transition from "Old" 
to "New" Georgia was introduced to distinguish Georgian national identity from an 
"Old" Georgia that was associated with poverty, corruption and ethnic conflicts, and 
introduce a "New" Georgia associated with the Rose Revolution frarned as a success 
story of Georgian Democracy. 
Keywords: national identity, identity, media, Rose Revolution, flagging homeland, 
Rustavi 2, critical discourse analysis, television news. 
Résumé 
Cette recherche se propose d'analyser la reconstruction de l'identité nationale géorgienne 
à la suite de la Révolution de Roses en novembre 2003, une époque où de nouvelles 
définitions de l'identité géorgienne ont émergé. J'ai décidé d'axer ma recherche sur la 
façon dont les médias, surtout la chaîne Rustavi 2, ont contribué à la formation et à la 
dissémination des discours dominants sur l'identité nationale géorgienne. L'approche 
méthodologique que j'utilise repose sur l'analyse critique du discours de la couverture 
médiatique et onze entretiens semi structurés, pour d'identifier les discours dominants sur 
l'identité nationale géorgienne exposés et véhiculés dans les médias, et analyser comment 
ces onze personnes, de par leur appartenance à différentes origines ethniques, ont 
intériorisé et négocié, ou au contraire rejeté, ces discours dominants. Les résultats de cette 
recherche exploratoire suggèrent que la couverture médiatique de la Révolution de Roses 
a engendré un important débat autour de l'identité nationale géorgienne par la transition 
entre "ancienne" et "nouvelle" Géorgie et l'unité du peuple géorgien. Pour accentuer 
cette unité discursive, les médias ont véhiculé une image de l'identité nationale éliminant 
et réduisant au silence la réalité multiethnique de la Géorgie, tout en mettant en avant le 
Christianisme et une culture géorgienne unique. Ces deux derniers aspects ont même été 
représentés comme des éléments unificateurs. Le discours sur la transition entre 
"ancienne" et"nouvelle" Géorgie a été introduit pour faire table rase d'une ancienne 
Géorgie alors associée à la pauvreté, la corruption et les conflits ethniques et présenter la 
Révolution de Roses comme le grand succès de la Nouvelle Géorgie Démocratique. 
Mots-clé: identité nationale, identité, médias, Révolution de Roses, flagging homeland, 
Rustavi 2, nouvelles télévisée, analyse critique du discours. 
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Introduction 
The concept of national identity has always fascinated me as it is one of the most presént 
things in our lives but at the same time it is the least questioned one. National identity is 
something that is rarely put under scrutiny and is largely accepted as a natural formation. 
The phenomenon that 1 would like to explore in my research is the reconstruction of 
Georgian national identity after the events of the Rose Revolution in November 2003 
when the new definitions of Georgian national identity have emerged. 
My interest in national identity is closely related to my personal experience, as 1 myself 
do not have a well-defined national identity. Being a daughter of a diplomat 1 have spent 
more than twelve years outside Georgia. During these years the modern Georgian 
national identity was constructed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Upon my return 
to Georgia, 1 discovered that 1 could not fully relate to the Georgian national identity and 
the values it carries. It is therefore my personal experience of not having a strong national 
identity that made me question the process of national identity construction; and.I find 
myself intrigued by how these identities are mobilized and reshaped by the introduction 
of new elements. 
ln this research 1 am particularly interested in how already existing national identities are 
reconstructed within discourse through the participation of the media. In other words, 1 
want to explore which topics and discourses on national identity are disseminated through 
media and later negotiated by ordinary people. The construction of national identity is a 
rather complex process, as national identities seem to der ive from an extensive repertoire 
of practices that are influenced by many factors, making it difficult to limit this 
transformation to one source. Cons ide ring the complexity of the concept of national 
identity, 1 have chosen to investigate one particular case study: the reconstruction of the 
Georgian national identity after the events of the Rose Revolution in November 2003, 
which at the time were the center of the Georgian media' s attention. This study will shed 
light on how the Rose Revolution happened in Georgia and the role of the media within 
the process. 1 believe that this study will help researchers gain a better understanding of 
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national identity reconstruction, and furtherrnore its role in the peaceful revolutions that 
took place in the Eastern Europe and Middle Asia from 2000 to 2005. By closely 
analyzing the case of the Rose Revolution in Georgia it will be possible to clarify the link 
between the media and the peaceful revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. 
Before discussing the theoretical frarnework and specific questions of my research, it is 
important to briefly contextualize the events of the Rose Revolution. Taking place in 
November 2003, 1 the Rose Revolution was the second revolution in a series of peaceful 
revolutions that started in Serbia in 2000 and was followed by the Ukraine in 2004 and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2005. In the modem history of independent Georgia, the Rose Revolution 
marked a new era in which serious political confrontation was resolved peacefully. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was characterized by the rise of strong 
nationalistic movements, followed by violence in the majority of the post-Soviet 
countries that were in the search of a national identity. Georgia's modem history has also 
been marked by violence, including the civil war in 1992 and the ethnic conflicts in the 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that are still not resolved. However, 
the peaceful resolution of the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the similar events of the 
Orange Revolution one year later in the Ukraine, were seen by many, as a new chapter in 
the history of post-Soviet countries as they moved towards development and the adoption 
of democratic values. 
The Rose Revolution of November 2003 was characterized by maSSIve peaceful 
demonstrations in response to the President Eduard Shevardnadze's and his supporters' 
attempt at manipulating the results of the parliarnentary elections held on November 2nd 
2003 (Hewitt, 2003: 3). The demonst~ations reached its climax on November 22nd 2003, 
when opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili and his supporters seized the parliament 
building with roses in their hands. The next day president Shevardnadze resigned. 
Although fraudulent election results were named as the primary motivator that provoked 
these demonstrations, in reality it was just one among many. Other catalytic features of 
Georgia's pre-revolution environment included extreme poverty and corruption - where 
1 For more detailed overview of the Rose Revolution see Annex 2 
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52% of the population lived on the verge of poverty - as weIl as unsettled conflicts in 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (He witt, 2003). 
What began as a demonstration against Shevardnadze and his government in the capital 
Tbilisi soon became a massive, weIl-organized event with thousands of participants from 
ail over Georgia suppot:ting oppositional forces and demanding the resignation of 
Shevardnadze. Throughout these events there was 24-hour media coverage. As Spurling 
argues, one of the commercial TV Channels - Rustavi 2 - "ran rather biased coverage" 
openly supporting the opposition movement and its leader, Saakashvili, who currently is 
the president of Georgia (Spurling, 2003: 2). While supporiing opposition leaders, 
Rustavi 2 also actively urged people to come outside and join the demonstrators. Later, 
when the ,events of the Rose Revolution were over but still in the spotlight, Rustavi 2 
started running a promotional commercial for their channel c1aiming responsibility for 
the Revolution. 
In the media and political discourse the Rose Revolution was framed as a success story of 
Georgian democracy. The Rose Revolution introduced significant changes to Georgian 
national identity and these changes were primarily disseminated through the media. My 
goal is to trace and analyze dominant discourses on Georgian national identity flagged in 
the media, and to explore how interviewed respondents of different ethnic origins 
negotiated these changes. To achieve this goal 1 have chosen to combine two different 
methods: critical discourse analysis of the media archive and semi-structured interviews. 
ln the first chapter 1 will present a detailed "problématique" around the reconstruction of 
Georgian national identity and the specific research questions of this study. 1 will also 
elaborate the concepts of identity, national identity, and the relation between the media 
and national identity. Finally 1 will situate Georgian national identity within its historical 
context. In the second chapter 1 will discuss the methodologies used in this research, 
notably critical discourse analysis of Rustavi 2's media archive during the final two days 
of the Rose Revolution and semi-structured interviews conducted three years from the 
conclusion of the Rose Revolution. The third chapter presents the critical discourse 
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analysis of the chosen media archive and the discussion. Subsequently, the forth chapter 
concentrates on the analysis of the interviews conducted within this research. Finally, in 
the fifth chapter 1 will present the conclusion with the findings of this exploratory study 
and the questions it raises for the future research. 
1. Conceptual Framework 
1.1. Identity 
Given that national identity is a very complex concept it is hard to limit its reconstruction 
to one source, therefore multiple elements have to be articulated and questioned. As 
many authors recognize national identity construction is largely influenced by power 
relations, therefore important power mechanisms, such as inclusion and exclusion based 
on difference, categorization and selective mobilization of history have to be examined. 
But before discussing national identity it is important to highlight how the principle 
theorists of cultural studies conceptualize identity. 
On a general theoretical level discussion around the concept of identity is underpinned 
by the tension between two opposed perspectives: the essentialist and non-essentialist 
(Woodward, 1993). The essentialist vision is based on the argument that identity is 
constant and once emerged, always remains the same. As Kathryn Woodward elaborates: 
in the essentialist vision "there is one clear;authentic set of characteristics which define a 
certain identity and they do not alter across time" (Woodward, 1993: Il). These claims 
of constant identity are based on an essentialist vision of hi st ory , race, and ethnicity 
(Woodward, 1993). 
The non-essentialist vision is much more complex and provides a better opportunity to 
adequately analyze concepts of identity and national identity. According to this 
perspective, the process of identity construction is Înfinite in time and therefore can never 
be completed (Woodward, 1993). As Rotry argues, identity does not possess a stable 
core, "it is centreless and [a] contingent web constituted by networks of beliefs and 
desires" (Rotry cited in Edensor, 2002: 29). As Woodward explains, in the non-
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essentialist vision, instability of identity is recognized and the construction of identity is 
explained in terms of differences that provoke opposition to different' identities. As Tim 
Edensor argues: "identity is al ways in process, is always being reconstituted in a procêss 
of becoming; By virtue of location in social, material, temporal and spatial contexts" 
(Edensor, 2002: 29). 
For my research 1 intend to adopt the non-essentialist perspective, which 1 believe more 
precisely articulates the concept of identity, incorporating aIl of its complexity and 
instability. To define the concept of identity 1 borrow from Stuart Hall who argues that 
"identity is constructed on the back of recognition of sorne common origin or shared 
characteristics with another person or group" (Du Gay, & Hall, 1996:' 2). In other words, 
when defining identity it is always important to acknowledge that identities emerge from 
our feelings of belonging to sorne particular group that shares the same values, traditions, 
and symbols. This is more of an emotional attachrnent as identity is not inherent, but 
rather invented and constructed. As Hall further argues, 
"identities are subject to radical historicization and though identities seem to 
invoke an origin in the historical past with which they continue to correspond, 
actually idèntities are about questions of using the resources of history, language 
and culture in the process of becoming rather than being" (Du Gay, & Hall, 1996: 
4). 
As Chris Barker further clarifies identity is a "contingent historical-cultural formation" 
(Barker, 2000: 197). 
As the construction of identity is dependent on multiple factors, this process is 
characterized by the centrality of power relations. Identities are not natural or pre-
existing; On the contrary, they are constructed in a desired mànner by the interplay of 
internaI and external power relations. As Hall argues, identities are constructed ~ithin a 
discourse; "They are produced in specific historical contexts in specific institutional 
frames byJ the play of specific modalities of power" (Du Gay, & Hall, 1996: 6). It is hard 
to specify exactly how cultural power is exercised, as this depends on the specific 
context. Yet, at the same time, there are always core elements that are more or less 
al ways present in the identity construction process. As Ernesto Laclau argues, one of the 
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mechanisms of exercising power is defining certain boundaries or margins that identity 
cannot violate by strategies of exclusion and inclusion (Laclau cited in Du Gay, & Hall, 
1996). identity construction is based on the exclusion and repression of certain elemeÎ1ts 
that threaten so-called "unit y," thereby establishing certain violent hierarchies between 
the included and the excluded (Laclau in Du Gay, & Hall, 1996). As Homi K. Bhabha 
claims, "unities that identities proclaim are in fact constructed within the play of power 
and exclusion and are the result not of a natural and inevitable primordial totality, but of 
naturalized over-determined process[es] of closure" (Bhabha cited· in Du Gay, & Hall, 
1996: 5). 
Furthermore, identities are constructed by exercising cultural power, which possesses 
many mechanisms. Certain central mechanisms appear to have always been present, such 
as inclusion and exclusion based on factors of difference; other mechanisms include 
mobilization and interpretation of history, and invention of traditions, values, images and 
symbols. Within these identity-constructing mechanisms, categorization has an 
important place. As Richard Jenkins argues, categorization contributes towards 
determining symbolic boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Jenkins accentuates two 
types of identification: the internaI and the external (Jenkins, 2000). By the external 
categorization we define others that are excluded, and by the internaI categorization we 
define ourselves as included. As Billig argues, "to achieve positive identity, groups will 
. compare themselves positively with contrasting outgroups, for instance nations will 
produce flattering stereotypes. of themselves and demeaning stereotypes of others" 
(Billig, 1995: 66). As Woodward argues, by placing themselves in opposition to "others," 
national identities become ever-stronger. For example: something that is part of the 
Georgian national identity is automatically opposed to the Armenian one, and through 
this opposition the authenticity of each national identity is reinforced and strengthened 
(Woodward, 1993). 
As Seyla Benhabib writes: 
"Every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from one who is not [ ... ] 
what is shocking is not for the evitable dialectic of identity/difference but rather the 
atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating 
difference and otherness" (Benhabib, 1996: 3). 
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This playon opposition and difference is marked by language, traditions, values and 
symbols. Alongside other elements, symbols play a crucial role in establishing borders'of 
inclusion and exclusion. As Edensor oudines, the most powerful symbols are very fluid, 
and according to the context, the symbol can either become inclusive or exclusive 
(Edensor, 2002). In general, inclusion and exclusion can be perforrned by four distinct 
mechanisms: discursively, by usage of certain words like "we," "our," "their" and "they" 
which establish boundaries of belonging or exclusion; by symbols; by selective 
mobilization and interpretation of historical events, where certain events are brought to 
the forefront and others forgotten; or as Dejan Dmitrijevic argues, by traditions that are in 
most cases invented solely to reinforce or justify authenticity of a certain national identity 
(Dmitrijevic, 2004). 
1.1.2. National Identity 
In discussing identity, it is important to define nàtional identity in particular. As Chris 
Barker argues: "national identity is a forrn of imaginative identification with the symbols 
and discourse of the nation-state" (Barker, 2004: 252). In this definition by invoking 
imaginative identification Barker adheres to Benedict Anderson's theory of "imagined 
community": that a nation is an imagined community and that the creation of the nation 
and national identity was made possible largely by the development of printed media and 
the mass production of books (Anderson, 1996). While Anderson argues in favor of the 
printed media in drawing a national identity together, this does not mean that it was the 
only factor that contributed to this process. National identity - like many other identities 
- does not have one source, but rather is constituted from multiple complex elements 
within a cultural context. It is the interweaving of aU of these elements that creates the 
illusion of unit y in national identity. As Hall argues: 
"Instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, we should think of them as a 
discursive device which represents difference as unit y or identity. They are cross-
cut by deep internaI divisions and differences, and "unified" only through the 
exercise of different forms of cultural power" (Hall in Barker, 2004: 253). 
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As Barker further elaborates national identities are not simply political formations but 
rather systems of cultural representations that are reproduced as discursive action 
(Barker, 2000). lt is primarily "symbolic and discursive dimensions of national ide,ntity· 
that creates the idea of origins, continuity and traditions" (Barker, 2000: 197). The link 
between discourse and national identity is important to my research as 1 plan to explore 
reconstruction of Georgian national identity in the discourse disseminated in the media. 
In other words, my goal is to see how discourse on Georgian national identity was 
reformulated. 
Ruth W odak explains that the construction of national identity "builds on the emphasis 
on a common history and collective memory" (Wodak, Reisigl, & De Cillia 1999: 154). 
Collective memory is a concept developed by Halbwachs and refers to "historical 
continuity by recalling specific elements from the archive of historical memory" 
(Halbwachs cited in Wodak, Reisigl, & De Cillia, 1999: 155). Similarly, for Bhabha it is 
a "national narrative" that ensures the creation of national identity and consolidates 
people (Bhabha, 1990). National narrative is characterized by a "strange forgetting" of 
negative aspects of the nation' s past and remembrance of other aspects that constitute the 
nation' s narrative (Bhabha, 1990: 310). In other words, national narratives are highly 
selective to ensure the vision of continuity and homogeneity of national identity. Most 
importantly national narratives are not spontaneous but on the contrary are "produced and 
reproduced and spread by actors in concrete institutionalized contexts" (Wodak, Reisigl, 
& De Cillia, 1999: 155). As D. C. Martin elaborates, "national narratives channel 
political emotions so that they can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power; transform 
the perceptions of the past and of the present" (Martin, 1995: 13). 
Primarily national identity is constructed to ensure a vision of unit y by eliminating 
difference and otherness and emphasizing unit y and homogeneity. For example, after the 
dissolution of the USSR, many post-Soviet and Eastern European countries induding 
Georgia created new national identities and national narratives that were consequently 
internalized by the people; aiding in fulfilling the illusion of unit y for a certain national 
identity. Differences blatantly present in Georgia, such as its multiethnic population; were 
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ignored. Meanwhile elements that contributed to the vision of unit y , such as the Georgian 
language, the Georgian ethnic group, and the selective mobilization and interpretation of 
Georgian history, were brought to the forefront to create a natural vision of a unified 
national identity. As Karmen Erjavec argues, "the collapse of the communist hegemony 
raised new questions about the meaning of national identity and these questions were 
answered in terms of ethnic identities" (Erjavec, 2003: 83). 
1.1.3. National Identity and Media 
As stated above, 1 am interested in the dynamic role of the media in the process of 
Georgian national identity construction after the events of the Rose Revolution. Yet, how 
central is the media in the construction of national identities? Many researchers in 
Cultural and Media Studies argue in favor of the strong effects of the media in the 
construction of national identity (Barker, 2004). For David Morley and Kevin Robins, 
TV broadcasting and especially broadcast news are "nation binders" something that helps 
to construct a sense of national unit y in time and space (Morley, & Robins, 1995: 10). As 
these authors argue, with the aid of national broadcasting, dispersed individuals come 
together as a community that shares the same concems, the same interests in the shared 
space, at the same time (Ibid). As Barker argues, the ritualistic watching of television 
contributes to a sense of citizenship and helps to situate the viewers in relation to a range 
of political concems (Barker, 2004). According to Barker's vision, television helps to 
maintain and diffuse national identity and the changes made to it; as television addresses 
individuals as a part of a nation (Ibid). Barker claims that "television connects 
representations with domestic routines to facilitate the production of national identity" 
(Barker, 2004: 61). In other words, Barker places media at the he art of national identity 
construction and presents it as a tool for diffusing and disseminating ideological elements 
that define certain national identities. 
As Billig argues, "media uses the naturalized syntax of hegemony, simultaneously 
, 
speaking to and for the nation in both senses of representation" (Billig, 1995: 115). 
Therefore, media plays an important role in fixing the "common-sense" meanings of 
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'certain national identities. The media, alongside other mechanisms, actively participates 
in the power game that shapes national identity according to the dominant ideology. As 
Gramsci explains,"ideology is not just a question of explicit political beliefs, but if is 
also a material force; it organizes human masses" (Gramsci cited in Bennet, 1981: 209). 
According to Gramsci, the struggle over hegemony is led by the "common sense" which 
goes widely unquestioned; this struggle is continually transfonning and is not as innocent 
or spontaneous as in many cases il is represented to be (Gramsci in Bennet, 1981: 203). 
Dmitrijevic argues that media provides grounds for the legitimization or internalization of 
the reconstructed national identity. In other words, one sustains another as every major 
change to national identity demands legitimization from the people who have to adopt the 
new identity (Dmitrijevic, 2004). As Schlesinger argues, television,- especially news -
provides a stage for producing interpretations of nationhood for broader diffusion and 
eventual collective consumption (Schlesinger, 1991). By providing the stage and place 
for national contents, television in general, and news in particular is recognized as one of 
the most important national texts participating in boundary making; it contributes towards 
the categorizing of viewers in the national community as inc1uded or exc1uded. 
Therefore, by diffusing national contents, media contributes towards creating habits of 
national thinking. It is important to note that media alone does not create national 
identity, though it surely has sorne effect on it and further promotes il. For instance, in 
my research l have chosen to analyze media coverage of the Rose Revolution as a central 
element but l don't argue that the media alone participates in the national identity 
\ 
reconstruction. 
Many authors criticize theories on the strong effects of the media. Although, they 
recognize the importance of media in the national identity construction process, they put 
emphasis on other practices which in addition to media, participate in national identity 
construction. As Philip Schlesinger argues, very often "gratuitous assumptions are made 
. . 
about linkages between national identity and the media, but these linkages have to be 
demonstrated" (Schlesinger cited in Law, 2003: 299). Billig (1995) and Edensor (2002) 
recognize the importance of media, but they do not place the media at the center of the 
national identity construction process. For Billig, national identity is not sustained by 
15 
exotic cases of nationalism that emerge in crisis situations, but on the contrary, that the 
national identity is embedded within everyday semiotic routines (Billig, 1995: 300). 
According to Billig, "the nation is habitually recognized in acts of acknowledgment ....:. in 
activities desc,ribed as "flagging home land" - where participation in a national collective 
is gently woven into routine daily practices, as well as habits of language such as the 
joining of the national body into an inclusive "us"" (Billig, 1995: 6). Through the 
mechanisms of "banal nationalism" described by Billig, the presence of the home land or 
nation is naturalized as it is presented as a context while telling the story. Even the. usage 
of the all inclusive "we" does not seemunnatural in any way (Billig, 1995: 364). While 
"flagging homeland," national identity is made very present, but at the same time not too 
artificial: for example, while watching the news we don't really question why the 
pronoun "we" is used or sorne particular person is presented as a national hero. As 
mentioned above, in my research 1 don't argue that media alone plays the principal role in 
the national identity reconstruction. 1 recognize that media together with everyday 
practices described by Billig contribute towards introducing and sustaining changes to the 
national identity. To cover both media and everyday practices in my exploratory research 
1 have chosen to use two different methods: critical discourse analysis of the media 
coverage and semi-structured interviews held in three years after the Rose Revolution. 
1.2. Problématique: The Case of Georgian National Identity 
In order to discuss the case of Georgian national identity it is important to situate 
it in the nation's historical context and gain insight how Georgian authors have 
articulated it. In the early 1990s, Georgia was one of the many post-Soviet countries in 
search of a national identity. As Manuel Castells points out, in 74 years the Soviet Union 
was unable to create a national identity in the sense that "communities may be imagined, 
but not necessarily believed" (Castells, 1997: 39). Consequently, the collapse of the 
USSR "gave rise to the assertion of newly reclaimed national and ethnic identities in the 
search for lost identities" (Woodard, 1993: 17). As a result, forms of religious, ethnic, 
and national identification have re-emerged (Ibid). 1 would therefore like to closely 
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question and highlight the main elements mobilized during the search for a modem 
Georgian national identity. 
1.2.1 Historical context 
The first attempt to construct a Georgian national identity· was undertaken in the 19th 
Century by a group of Georgian intelligentsia known as the TergdaleulnP, in response to 
the domination and repression of Georgia under the Russian empire. As Jones writes, 
"the Tegrdaleulni were the first conscious nation builders in Georgia" (Jones, 2006: 37). 
Educated in Europe, the Tergdaleulni were successful in creating and diffusing the 
discourse of glorification of the Georgian nation and its history by rewriting a collective 
history and for the first time formalizing the Georgian language. One of the most 
successful strategie decisions however, was the creation of the "Association for the 
diffusion of literacy" which contributed towards the popularization of Georgian history 
and literature among the larger public. As one of the leaders of Tergdaleulni IIya 
Chavchavardze argued, the "degeneration of the nation starts when the nation forgets its 
history" (Chavchavadze, 1990: 51). 
This selective mobilization of history and Georgian language set out to create a natural 
character for Georgian national identity and re-unite the Georgian people by portraying 
long tradition of statehood. For the Tegrdaleulni it was statehood, and precisely the 
Georgian state that created and sustained the Georgian national identity (Jorjadze, 1990: 
35). By the close association of the state and national identity they tried to prove that 
neither Georgian identity nor the Georgian state were new inventions but on the contrary 
had persisted across time. Their argument was far from a reality as at that time Georgia 
simply did not have statehood as it was incorporated into the Russian Empire as just one 
of the provinces. As Gordadze notes, the Tegrdaleulni by rewriting history ensured 
2 The "Tergdaleulni" were a young group of Georgian intelligentsia in 1860s- I880s who advocated for 
educational reform, cultural freedom and self- govemment for Œ:orgians within Russian Empire. The 
name on the group cornes from the river Terek, the ostensible river between Russia and Georgia which they 
crossed to receive education in the Universities of Russian Empire and Europ.ean countries. 
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Georgian nation's continuity in time and space and contributed largely to the creation of 
the m'odern Georgian nation (Gordadze, 1999). 
Georgia realized its aspirations to statehood only in 1918 when the first Georgian Social 
Democratic Republic was established. Unfortunately independence was short lived as in 
1921 Georgia was occupied by Boishevik Russia and one year later was incorporated into 
the Soviet Union. While Georgia was still part of the Soviet Union dissident movement 
for restoration of Georgian statehood started to gain popularity in the 1960s and reached 
its peak in the 1980s with the liberation movement (Jones, 2004). Throughout the Soviet 
dominance in Georgia was marked by large-scale cultural and political repression. Only 
in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was Georgia again in search of a new 
national identity. Therefore, l wou Id like to discuss the· main elements described as 
integral part of the Georgian national identity by contemporary Georgian authors. 
At the forefront of Georgian national identity, Georgian history occupies an important 
place. As Gordadze argues, "passion for the past serves as the source of pride and dignity 
for the nation and therefore is an essential part of the nationalistic ideology" (Gordadze, 
1999: 54). Georgian historic discourse can be separated into two major parts. The first 
tracing back to the Hittite empire in the 18th century B.C. and the second connecting to 
the 11_13th centuries A.D. entitled the Golden Age. Many Georgian historians consider 
the Hittite Empire as the first homeland of Georgians (Chkeidze, 2002; Vardosanidze, 
2004). The association of the Hittite Empire and the modern Georgian state is used to 
situate Georgian national identity as one of the oldest however, the lack of the authentic 
sources on this issue leaves a large space for interpretation. 
The second part of the historic discourse concerns 11_13th centuries A.D. and is 
associated with pride and nostalgia for an era when the Georgian Kingdom was glorious, 
powerful and unified. As Rostom Chkeidze argues, the Golden Age proves that 
Georgians have influenced the major historical events and that this energy is not gone, 
but waiting for the appropriate moment to rise from the oblivion (Chkeidze, 2002). The 
Golden Age is most often evoked today in the hope of reuniting shattered Georgia, as 
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King David IV reunited the Georgian Kingdom in 12th century A.D. This association of 
two contextually different events is often used in modem political discourse; for instance 
President Mikheil Saakashvili chose to deliver his inaugural speech in January 2S th 200S 
on the tomb of King David IV as a sign that he will repeat David's glorious path .. 
Saakashvili, on this symbolic site for Georgians, promised to reunite a shattered Georgia. 
As he said: "Georgia's territorial integrity is the goal of my life" (cited in Hewitt, 2003: 
4). 
In the historical discourse "proto-nationalism" plays a major role as it provides a source 
for the construction of the Georgian national identity (Gordadze, 1999). Proto-
nationalism is a terrn used by Eric Hobsbawm who argues that "proto-nationalism should 
not be mistaken for modern nationalism" (Hobsbawm in Gordadze, 1999: 6S). As 
Gordadze explains - "pour le nationalisme c'est l'allégeance à la nation qui prime et 
constitue la source de pouvoir politique, pour le proto-nationalisme, c'est la loyauté 
dynastique" (Gordadze, 1999: 65). For instance, historical discourse has created an 
illusion that the Georgian Kingdom was the beginning of the Georgian nation and in the 
first years of the independence, Georgian nationalists argued that the Georgian national 
identity had not been constructed anew, but rather remembered after liberation from the 
Soviet dominance. In comparison with the Golden Age largely omitted from the 
historical discourse on Georgian national identity are the IS_18th centuries A.D. that were 
marked by the internal conflicts that resulted in the dissolution of the Georgian Kingdom 
and occupation by the Russian Empire (Vardosanidze, 2004). 
Another heavily accentuated element surrounding Georgian national identity is 
Christianity, which is viewed as a unifying factor and an integral part of Georgian 
national identity. As one of the Georgian philosophers Merab Mamardashvili writes, 
Christianity was the main force that transformed Georgians from an ethnic group to a 
nation (Mamardashvili, 2003: 5S). Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first controversial president 
of Georgia largely blamed for the ethnic conflicts in the early 1990s, pointed out that 
history of Georgia can not be viewed separately from Christianity (Gamsakhurdia, 1991). 
After aU, Georgians were second in the world after the Arrnenians to declare Christianity 
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as the state religion as early as 337 A.D. It is also important to note that two apostles of 
Jesus Andrew and Simon the. Canaanite, came to Georgia to preach. As Gordadze argues, 
Christianity is one of the most important components of the Georgian nationalistic 
ideology (Gordadze, 1999). Alongside being one of the most important components, 
Christianity plays an important role in inclusion/exclusion as it includes Christian 
Orthodox and excludes others, mainly ethnic minorities that practice different religions. 
When talking about Christianity in Georgia it is also important to discuss St. George, who 
is considered to be the patron saint of Georgia. Gamsakhurdia goes so far as to argue that 
in fact the country' s name is related to St. George (Gamsakhurdia, 1999). As he further 
points out Christianity in Georgia has evolved into "Giorgianism" (in Georgian St.George 
is Tsminda Giorgi) (Gamsakhurdia, 1999: 20). Both on religious and politicallevels, St. 
George is considered as a symbol of re si stance and victory. There is a symbolic link 
traced between St. George defeating the dragon, and the Kingdom of Georgia defeating 
the Seljuk Turks in 1121 A.D. (Gamsakhurdia, 1999). St. George is a also largely 
associated with the King David IV and the Golden Age, as his army portrayed St. George 
on their flag when they defeated the Seljuk Turks (Chkeidze, 2002). 
Even today St. George is largely present on the national symbols of Georgia. St. George 
is the central image on Georgia's new coat ofarms and the central element of the new 
"five-cross flag" is St. George's cross. As Chkeidze writes, "St. George led the way to the 
victorious and glorious Georgia that we hope and dream to restore sorne day" (Chkeidze, 
2004: 35). In other words, St. George became the symbol of a prosperous Georgia. It is 
also interesting to note that in Georgia St. George's Day is celebrated not once but twice a 
year: on May 6th and November 23 rd, which oddly coincided with the Rose Revolution's 
climax on November 23 rd 2003. 
Finally, the last element l would like to discuss is the duality of Georgian culture that 
incorporates both occidental and oriental elements. Georgia is a country on the crossroads 
between Europe and Asia and is equally influenced by both. The best demonstration of 
this duality is through Georgian culture, particulady the Georgian literary tradition. As 
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Guram Asatiani writes, the synthesis of occidental and oriental cultures is the defining 
feature of the Georgian national identity, as this combination creates something new and 
unique that is extremely organic (Asatiani, 1990). In the political discourse after the Rose 
Revolution this duality was dismissed for Europeanism that was accentuated as the 
principal element inherent to Georgian culture. 
However, this duality between Europe and Asia is not the only one present in Georgia, 
another is the blending oftragedy and comedy. Russian writer Boris Pasternak defined 
Georgian culture as unusual mixture of deep tragedy and endless festivity (Pasternak in 
Asatiani, 1990). As Asatiani writes, literature is the central element in Georgian national 
identity, as it carries the Georgian soul betler than anything else with its internaI conflict 
and duality (Asatiani, 1990). Indeed, literature and especially the historical novel did play 
a defining role in the construction of Georgian national identity. As Gordadze argues, 
numerous historie novels contributed largely to the re-writing ofhistory, mainly 
highlighting glorious times for the Georgians (Gordadze, 1999). 
The main elements discussed above were explicitly present both in the media coverage 
and the semi-structured interviews. However, the most accentuated element of the 
Georgian national identity was Christianity. 
1.2.2. Research Questions 
ln contrast to the violent events that occurred during the first years of Georgia's 
independence, the Rose Revolution proved to be an exclusively non-violent and a 
powerful event that changed Georgia's image and political orientation. The primary 
objective of my exploratory research is to gain a betler understanding of how Georgian 
nation~l identity was reconstructed after the events of the Rose Revolution. Particularly, 1 
am interested in how integral elements of the Georgian national identity were 
rearticulated and framed in the dominant discourses disseminated in the media coverage 
of the Rose Revolution. As the Rose Revolution was characterized by the dynamic 24-
hour media coverage this led me to question the ways in which the media and especially 
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television news contributed to the formation and dissemination of thé dominant 
discourses on Georgian national identity. 1 have decided to explore dominant discourses 
on national identity that were mobilized and disseminated to construct post-Rôse 
Revolution national identity through critical discourse analysis of the media coverage. 
"" 
As exclusion/inclusion is always a part of national identity construction 1 was also 
interested to see to what degree the post-Rose Revolution national identity flagged in 
media discourse had become inclusive of elements such as difference and diversity. 
Considering that Georgia is a multi-ethnic country with more than seven ethnic minority 
groups (Azeri s, Armenians, Russians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, Ukrainians and Kurds), 1 
intended to explore if it was possible for Georgia to abandon its homogenous illusion of 
Georgian nationhood and construct a new national identity that would embrace aIl its 
diversity. This part of my research will shed light on how the changing Georgian national 
identity addresses ethnic issues either by embracing or ignoring them. Embracing a 
diverse ethnic reality remains a concem for many post-Soviet countries, and by 
examining its place in media, 1 believe 1 will aid in building greater knowledge on this 
issue; helping researchers to delve deeper into issues conceming questions of ethnicity. 
Many authors in cultural studies argue that media plays key role in the national identity 
construction: Morley and Robins (1995) even calI the media the "nation binder." 
Although, the importance of the media is undeniable, l would argue that it is unjustified 
to present the media as the principal element of the national identity construction as it is 
just one among many elements in a wide range of everyday practices that influence this 
process. In fact 1 would agree with Billig (1995) in arguing that the' media and everyday 
practices combined, influence national identity construction to the greatest extent. 
Furthermore, 1 would argue that as the media circulates dominant discourses on national 
identity, it potentially re-shapes national identity and consequently then becomes a part of 
the everyday practices and routines that sustain national identity. In using the term 
"everyday practices" 1 am referring to everyday events and routines whereby national 
identity is embedded, constantly present and flagged. These routines and practices are 
described by Billig as "banal nationalism." According to Billig, "the term banal 
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nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the nations to be 
reproduced on daily basis" (1995: 6). As Gramsci argues, ideology "is the more general 
term for the ways in which sets of ideas and assumptions become dominant materÎal 
forces of society", therefore common sense is "the sub-stratum" of ideology (Gramsci 
cited in Bennet, 1981: 207). Both the media and everyday practices are saturated by the 
ideological habits that sustain national identity. As argued by Gramsci, ideology is 
inseparable from commonsense, and both go largely unquestioned (Gramsci in Bennet, 
1981). As noted by Billig, ideological habits present in everyday life and the media 
perform the action of "flagging homeland" (1995: 6). By "flagging homeland" practices 
are repeatedly reproduced in everyday life and media: and though these practices national 
identity is inscribed in common sense, which is represented as unquestionable. By 
"flagging homeland" n~tional identity is made omnipresent, but at the same time natural 
as it is presented as part of a united national context. For example, the media "routinely 
use a deixis of little words" such as "we" or "they" which go largely unquestioned (Billig, 
1995: 174). These words are used to establish boundaries of inclusion or exclusion in a 
national context. This boundary making is subjected to temporal and ideological elements 
that are in constant flux, and therefore these boundaries are constantly shifting. The first 
part of my research precisely explores how this process of "flagging home land" took 
place during the media coverage of the Rose Revolution through critical discourse 
analysis. 
My second research question is closely interrelated to and flows from the first question: It 
concems how, after three years from the Rose Revolution, ordinary people have 
interiorized and negotiated or contrarily rejected dominant discourses on national identity 
framed and flagged by the media and politicians during the Rose Revolution. This part of 
my research concems individual perspectives on the Rose Revolution and the Georgian 
national identity three years after the events in November 2003. In exploring this facet 1 
am interested in how people conceive oftheir Georgian national identity, how they create 
categories of inclusion and exclusion, and how different these may be from the ones 
disseminated and flagged by the media during the Rose Revolution. Furthermore, 1 am 
interested in how their vision of the Rose Revolution has changed or remained stagnant 
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three years after these events. 1 have decided to address these question through semi-
structured interviews conducted with Il respondents of ethnic Georgians and 
representatives of ethnic minorities. 
1.3. Conclusion 
My research on the subject of Georgian national identity construction and the Rose 
Revolution has an exploratory character as the Rose Revolution is a considerably new 
phenomenon. It is extremely interesting that the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, one year later, bared an uncanny resemblance in how the 
events progressed and in that they were named revolutions. Additionally, both the Rose 
Revolution and the Orange Revolution were characterized by the dynamic media 
coverage which has led me to question the place of media in the strugg1e ~ver hegemony. 
While scholars such as Billig (1995) would argue that everyday practices and banal 
nationalism mainly sustain and legitimize changes made to the national identity, 1 would 
argue that as media circulates, it holds the potential to re-shape national identity and 
consequently then become a part of the everyday practices and routines that largely 
sustain national identity. As the Rose Revolution in Georgia is a new phenomenon, it has 
not been fully studied and within my research, 1 hope to delve deeper into the 
phenomenon of the Rose Revolution and its repercussions for Georgian national identity. 
Georgia is a very interesting case of a post-Soviet country in search of a national identity 
that must be Georgian, but at the same time, must encompass the country's diversity. 1 
would like to explore the feasibility of Georgia, after spending more than 70 years under 
the Soviet Union, to step away from a homogenous illusion of Georgian nationhood and 
to construct a national identity that embraces and advocates democratic values and 
diversity. With the interview component of my research, 1 was interested to see how 
Georgians and the members of the ethnic minorities perceive and interpret the Georgian 
national identity both prior and after the Rose Revolution. Additionally, 1 wanted to 
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explore if and how the Georgian national identity had bec orne inclusive of elements such 
as difference and diversity, or on the contrary, it remained exclusive. 
Georgia's post-Soviet history, rife with ethnic conflicts and confrontations, in sorne ways 
resembles the history of the Balkan countries. Yet Georgia, unlike the Balkans, did not 
receive much scholarly attention. It is my goal to investigate and highlight the complex 
processes of national identity construction in this post-Soviet country, focusing on the 
events of the Rose Revolution, which took center-stage for both local and international 
media, and to find the place held by the Rose Revolution in the ongoing construction of 
Georgian national identity. 
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2. Research methodology 
To fully cover my research questions l have chosen to use two different, complementary 
methods within qualitative methodology: critical discourse analysis of the media archive 
of the Rose Revolution for the first part of the research and semi-structured interviews for 
the second part. With cri tic al discourse analysis l will be able to detect and analyze 
dominant discourses and capture formai portrayal of the Georgian national identity; in 
contrast, interviews will provide more personal insight to how ordinary people of 
different ethnic origins in Georgia have negotiated the post-Rose Revolution changes to 
the Georgian national identity. 
2.1 Critical discourse analysis 
To answer my first research question and identify dominant discourses on Georgian 
national identity framed in the media, l have decided to undertake a critical dis course 
analysis of the media coverage on the last two keys dates of the Rose Revolution, 
November 22nd and 23rd 2003. My choice of critical discourse analysis was determined. 
by the fact that this particular method is regularly used to study identity as a discursive 
process. It approaches identity as an ongoing process "accompli shed through social 
interaction and particularly through communication" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004: 237). 
Critical discourse analysis will help to determine how media and particularly Rustavi 2, 
television channel that was closely associated with the Rose Revolution, flagged 
Georgian national identity in their coverage. Also this particular method will help me to 
identify which dominant discourses on Georgian national identity were mohilized and 
disseminated and how these particular discourses played out difference and similarity as 
inclusive and exclusive factors. 
Critical discourse analysis is an appropriate method for my particular research as it 
"mediates the connection between language and, social context, and by this allows 
incorporating political context, everyday reality and cultural background in the complex , 
process ofidentity construction" (Fairc1ough, 1995: 189). As Hardy and Ainsworth 
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explain, "critical discourse analysis builds on Cultural Studies and involves the use of 
discourse analytic techniques combined with a critical perspective, to interrogate social 
phenomenon" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004: 236). Critical discourse analysis by 
"examining how communication practices construct identities reveals the reproduction of 
power relations" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004: 238). 
While discussing critical discourse analysis it is important to describe what discourse is 
and specify what is meant by "critical discourse analysis". As Du Gay explains: 
"Discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about a 
topic and a way of producing a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. Thus the 
term refers both to the production of knowledge through language and 
representations and the way that knowledge is institutionalized, shaping social 
practices and setting new practices into play" (Du Gay, 1996: 43). 
Although "discourse is inaccessible in its entirety, traces of it are found in the texts that 
help to constitute it" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004: 236). In other words, discourses are 
realized through texts but they also include broader social and cultural structures. 
Conceming the cri tic al framework critical discourse analysis recognizes that particular 
vision of reality is not natural and "attempts to "de-naturalize" taken for granted 
assumptions" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004: 238). This reflects Foucault's emphasis on the 
contextually contingent nature oftruth and the importance of power relations. Foucault 
points out that in the discourse power and knowledge are interrelated, as discourse 
produces, defines and constructs the objects ofknowledge (Foucault, 1971). Foucault 
argues in favor of mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge and 
therefore knowledge is indissociable from regimes of power (Foucault, 1971). As' 
Fairclough elaborates, "discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes 
power relations" (Fairclough, 1992: 67). 
As there are riumerous approaches within discourse analysis it is important to explain 
why 1 have chosen to use critical discourse analysis. 1 have adopted this method because 
of its "focus on the relationship between the discourse and broader political context, 
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instead of studying only linguistic structures and language" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004: 
237). Although critical discourse analysis is largely associated with Norman Fairclough 
and linguistics, T choose to adhere to a broader definition of this method that mediates the 
connection between language and social context, incorporating political context, 
everyday reality and cultural background (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 2004; De Cillia, Reisigl, 
& Wodak, 1999). 
"Connection between the language and social context facilitates more satisfactory 
bridging of gap between texts and contexts and takes us beyond simple 
examinations of verbal or written interactions and allows us to appreciate the 
broader political context, as well as materia1 implications" (Ainsworth, & Hardy, 
2004: 239). ' 
As critical discourse analysis is specially designed to study identity "it involves an 
interest in the ways social members categorize themselves" (Van Dijk, 1997: 4). It 
approaches identity construction as an ongoing process through "social categorization as 
various classifications of people are brought into being, with practical effects for those 
targeted by these categories as weil as involved in their construction" (Hacking, 2000: 
57). In other words, critical discourse analysis recognizes the unstable nature of identity, 
and sees it as a result of a complex interplay of discourses and power relations. 
As national identity is a complex concept 1 have also integrated elements of gender and 
visual analysis of the media coverage of the Rose Revolution. However, the analysis 
primarily addressed the dominant discourses circulated by the media and speeches of 
politicalleaders featured in the media coverage of the Rose Revolution. 
2.1.1. Rustavi 2 
As media attention towards the Rose Revolution was very intense both inside and ~utside 
Georgia 1 have decided to analyze the coverage of one specifie Georgian TV channel 
Rustavi 2 for several reasons. Rustavi 2's portrayal of the events became inseparable 
from the Rose Revolution both in everyday life and in recorded history of the events. 
Therefore, my goal is to explore Rustavi 2's articulation of the Rose revolution in 2003, 
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which was to become a dominant discourse on the post-Rose Revolution Georgian 
national identity. The monopoly held by Rustavi 2 during the Rose Revolution can be 
explained by the fact that in 2003 the channel had little competition from other media and 
was the most popular channel in Georgia. In contrast with the state 1 st channel, Rustavi 2 
founded in 1994, was largely financed by Western Development Assistance, and 
represented the ideal of western reporting, different from the Soviet style that dominated 
Georgian media (Anable, 2006). To see which TV Channels operated in Georgia in 2003 
see Annex 3. 
Throughout the Rose Revolution, Rustavi 2 presented openly pro-opposition coverage of 
the events and was the most popular TV station with the highest ratings. Rustavi 2 was 
the first channel in Georgia to introduce investigative journalism that was mainly oriented 
towards the critique of the corrupt government of Shevardnadze "legitimizing what 
Georgians already knew conceming corruption in the government" (Anable, 2006: 16). 
A variety of investigative and debate programs were launched by Rustavi 2 including 
evening news Kurieri and 60 Minutes, which were almost entirely dedicated to the 
. critique of the corrupt governrnent officiaIs and their lavish lifestyles versus the 
omnipresent poverty in Georgian society. 
Having a long history of government critique, Rustavi 2 became the main force in the 
struggle against the unpopular President Shevardnadze and his government, and gave 
voice to people's anger. The government's unsuccessful attempts in 2001 to shut down 
Rustavi 2 triggered the channels popularity ev en mbre. But it was mainly during the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 when Rustavi 2's struggle against Shevardnadze and his government 
reached its climax. Not only harshly criticizing government, Rustavi 2 regularly provided 
a platform for the opposition leaders. As one of the opposition leaders notes, "Rustavi 2 
was the most prominent independent media outlet that played a distinctive role in making 
the Rose Revolution successful and non-violent" (Kandelaki, 2006: 1). Rustavi 2 also 
played an important role in urging people to join the demonstrations as President 
Saakashvili later notes "Rustavi 2 was very important. It was instrumental in bringing 
people outside" (cited in Anable, 2006: 15). As the owner of the channel Erosi 
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Kintsmarishvili acknowledged, Rustavi 2 "provided rather one sided covèrage of the 
events becoming an active part ofthe opposition" (cited in Anable, 2006: 18). After the 
Rose Revolution was over but still in the spotlight, Rustavi 2 began to run a promotional 
video proc1aiming themselves as the channel of the victorious people. As Georgian social 
scientist Ghia Nodia noted "One can confidently say that there would have been no 
revolution without the media" and by media of course meaning Rustavi 2 (cited in 
Anable, 2006: 23). 
2.1.2. The media archive 
ln the beginning of September 2006 when 1 arrived in Georgia to construct my archive, 1 
decided to obtain the archive footage of Rustavi 2 from November 2003 wh en the Rose 
Revolution took place. As Rustavi 2's archive footage was very extensive taking in 
consideration shortage of time and space, 1 had to make strategic choices on what dates of 
. the Rose Revolution would be put under the scrutiny. Therefore, 1 decided to concentrate 
on the key dates ofthe Rose Revolution, November 22nd and November 23 rd 2003. These 
particular dates determined the development of the events and were the most intense days 
ofthe Rose Revolution, with Rustavi 2 providing non-stop 24 hour coverage. On 
November 22nd 2003 opposition forces and their supporters seized the parliament 
building. On the final day of the Rose Revolution November 23 rd 2003, president 
Shevardnadze resigned, with his resignation marking the end of the Rose Revolution and 
of political confrontation in Georgia, that followed by the large-scale celebrations in the 
capital Tbilisi. On both ofthese days Rustavi 2 covered events live ail day. As the live 
coverage on November 22nd 2003, was very long, redundant and repetitive, 1 decided to 
limit my analysis to the 9 p.m. evening news "Kurieri Post Scriptum" that inc1uded ail the 
major stories of the day. 
ln contra st with November 22nd 2003, on November 23rd 2003 RustavÎ 2 coverage 
consisted only of live transmission throughout the day and there was no evening news. 
As live transmission can be lengthy and repetitive, 1 decided to concentrate on the key 
events of the day: the statement made by Eduard Shevardnadze on his resignation, 
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statements by the opposition leaders that foIlowed, comments by joumalists, and the 
celebrations that marked the beginning of the post-Rose Revolution era. Although it 
would have been interesting to analyze the comments of ordinary people on these days -
Rustavi 2 coverage did not include anycomments from the ordinary people at aIl. 
1 have analyzed the evening news of November 22nd and key news stories on November 
23 rd 2003 taking into account verbal and visual contents. This kind of analysis provided 
insight into how the Rose Revolution was covered by Rustavi 2 and highlighted the main 
points of struggle for a unified Georgian national identity. 1 have also attempted to 
highlight the status of Rustavi 2 and joumalists in the events of the Rose Revolution. 
With this study of Rustavi 2' s coverage, 1 sought to identify what was to become a 
dominant discourse on the post-Rose Revolution Georgian national identity. As 
mentioned above, 1 did not analyze only linguistic structures but also integrated historical 
and socio-political elements as combination of aIl these elements provided better 
opportunity to de Ive deeper into the national identity (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak 1999). 
As construction of national identity is a highly political topic speeches by politicians 
featured in Rustavi 2 coverage of November 22nd and 23rd 2003 occupied an important 
place in the archive; they provide an interesting insight into the articulation of Georgian 
national identity by the politicians. 
My goal here was to examine how the media in this case Rustavi 2, approached and 
framed the Georgian national identity and furthermore, how media was implicated in this 
hegemonic moment of nation-building by disseminating and creating a narrative of 
nation. National identities are understood as mental constructs because they are 
"discursively produced, reproduced and transformed by the discourses continually 
launched by media and politicians" (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak ,1999: 153). As there is 
no such thing as a constant national identity, rather it is reconstructed within discourse. 
Therefore my goal was to capture dominant discourses on national identity disseminated 
by Rustavi 2 during the Rose Revolution. As the discursive construction of national 
identities is always influenced by categorization and construction of uniqueness or 
difference it was important to see how dominant discourses disseminated through the 
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media, dealt with these issues (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak ,1999). 1 have also attempted 
to integrate the historical and political contexts within which the Rose Revolution 
occurred, as the y provide much-needed background for understanding and analyzing 
dominant discourses voiced during the Rose Revolution. The Rose Revolution was 
embedded in a specific historical context as it strongly resembled the powerful Liberation 
Movement in the late 1980s that was marked by the unit y of Georgian people in their 
struggle for the independence from the USSR. However, the Rose Revolution was the 
only instance in the modem history of Georgia when political confrontation was resolved 
peacefully; the Rose Revolution differed from Georgia's first years of independence that 
were marked by the violence that resulted in two breakaway regions and in ethnic 
conflicts. 
Since the Rustavi 2 footage integrated into the archive was in the Georgian language 1 
have translated it into English. As the translation was made by me, 1 recognize that sorne 
of its aspects were no doubt subjective. 
To enrich the archive with different political and ideological interpretations of the events, 
1 included sorne aspects of the press coverage in order to see the difference between how 
Rustavi 2 and newspapers framed the events of the Rose Revolution on November 22nd 
and 23 rd 2003. The analysis of the press coverage was not the central point ofmy 
research, and 1 used it to complement and reflect on the Rustavi 2 material. To see the list 
of the analyzed newspapers see Annex 3. 1 selected newspapers, according to their degree 
of popularity and circulation. All five selected newspapers were national newspapers 
sold throughout Georgia. 1 selected specific articles on the events ofNovember 22nd and 
23 rd 2003, analyzing each one starting with on what page it appeared, what was the title, 
the choice of words and interviews included in the article. 
ln addition to introducing elements of the press coverage, 1 have also integrated minor 
segments of a Rustavi 2 documentary made on the first anniversary of the Rose 
Revolution. Such as events ofNovember 21 st when thousands of people came to the 
capital Tbilisi to support the opposition forces. Media and politicalleaders framed this 
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event as the culmination of the unit y among the Georgian people. In the interviews that l 
have conducted, events ofNovember 21 5t 2003 were most often evoked as the most 
memorable moment of the Rose Revolution. 
2.2. Semi-structured interviews 
In the second part of my research l sought to explore how three years after the Rose 
Revolution, ordinary people interiorized and negotiated, or on the contrary rejected the 
national identity flagged in the media during the Rose Revolution. My goal was to 
determine how people currently conceive oftheir Georgian national identity, how they 
create categories of inclusion and exclusion and how these categories compare to the 
ones disseminated by the media during the Rose Revolution. To explore the personal 
opinions and perceptions ofthe ordinary people on the topic ofthe post-Rose Revolution 
Georgian national identity l chose to conduct semi-structured interviews. It is important 
to note that the interviews provide crucial data for my analysis as they incorporate a three 
year time difference (1 conducted Il semi-structured interviews in November 2006). As 
nature ofthis research is explorative, semi-structured interviews will contribute towards 
exploring the studied phenomenon in greater depth, and will touch on the experiences of 
the respondents (Gauthier, 2003). 
Overall, combined with discourse analysis that provides a more general account of 
dominant media discourses, interviews offered an opportunity to explore a more personal, 
in-depth picture of the post-Rose Revolution Georgian national identity. As Gubrium and 
Holstein (2002) note, semi-structured interviews rarely c?nstitute the sole source of data 
in research and are used in conjunction with other types of data gathering. Semi-
structured interviews offer an appropriate method as they provide much-needed liberty to 
the in~erviewees to express their ideas and opinions freely (Gauthier, 2003). As Alvesson 
notes, "loosely structured interviews are open to what the interviewee feels is relevant 
and important to talk about" (Alvesson, 2003: 13). Semi-structured interviews provide a 
rich account ofthe interviewee's experiences, knowledge, ideas, and impressions 
(Alvesson, 2003; Bryman, Bresnen, Beardsworth, & Keil, 1988; Fontana, & Frey, 1994; 
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Martin, & Turner, 1986; Holstein, & Gubrium, 1997). As Savoie- Zacj 
explains "l'entrevue semi- dirigée consiste en une interaction verbale animée de façon 
souple par le chercheur". Grâce à cette interaction, une compréhension riche du 
phénomène à l'étude sera construite conjointement avec interviewe" (Savoie- Zacj, 2003: 
296). 
As l am interested in the perception of the Rose Revolution and post-Rose Revolution 
national identity, semi-structured interviews can play an important role, as the y are 
especially designed for the exploration of complex questions (Gubrium, & Holstein, 
2002; Atkinson, 1998; Douglas, 1985; Rubin, & Rubin, 1995; Denzin 1989a, 1989b; 
Geertz 1988). As Johnson argues: 
"Qualitative interviews are likely the best approach for the questions of greater 
depth, where the knowledge sought is often taken for granted and not readily 
articulated by most ofmembers and research question involves highly conflicted 
emotions as respondents have complicated, multiple perspectives on same 
phenomenon" (Johnson, 2002: 105). 
2.2.1. Selection of respondents 
As the background of the respondents highly guides the outcome of the interview, l have 
chosen to interview two groups of people: ethnic Georgians and representatives ofethnic 
minorities in Georgia. My choice was detennined by the fact that one of my principle 
research interests was to explore inclusi veness or exclusi veness of Georgia' s multiethnic 
reality in the post-Rose Revolution national identity. It is important to note that after 
analyzing the media archive l have discovered a significant gap in the discourse on 
Georgian national identity, where ethnic minorities were not addressed at aIl. As Foucault 
explains, "discontinuity is characteristic of every discursive statement and systems of 
dispersion are the inherent to the discursive statements" (Foucault, 1972: 37). In 
Georgia where ethnic minorities constitute from 20-30 percent of the population, ethnic 
questions were largely muted. This particular choice ofrespondents gave me an 
opportunity to discuss the nature of the Georgian identity from the point ofview of ethnic 
Georgians and representatives of ethnic minorities and to compare their opinions. AlI the 
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respondents were asked to discuss if the post-Rose Revolution Georgian national identity 
was ready to embrace its multiethnic nature. They were also asked to comment on the 
place of ethnic minorities within the Rose Revolution media coverage. 
1 decided to locate my respondents through a snowball approach that is largely used in 
qualitative interviewing (Holstein, & Gubrium, 1995; Spradley 1979; Warren 2002). 1 
located my tirst respondent, a press joumalist, who 1 met while working as a reporter on 
television in Georgia. She helped me to locate five more Georgian respondents through 
her social network. The situation was more complicated with respondents from ethnic 
minorities. The first person 1 located was an Annenian acquaintance, who helped me to 
find four respondents one Arrnenian, two Azeri and one Ukrainian. A list of the interview 
respondents, with information detailing their age, occupation and ethnic origin may be 
found in Annex 1. 
It was especially difficult to find people from ethnic minorities because of the climate of 
fear generated by an incident that happened in October 2006: three high ranking Russian 
military officiais and ten Georgian citizens, several of them of Arrnenian origin, were 
arrested in connection with a spy scandaI between Georgia and Russia. This incident was 
largely covered both by Georgian and Russian media further complicating rather 
unfriendly relations between the two countries. An Abkhazian couple and an Ossetian 
respondent, whom 1 had contacted prior to this incident, cancelled their agreement to be 
interviewed after the spy scandaI. They explained their decision by stating that they were 
not willing to speak about political issues as it might have been used against them by the 
Georgian government. Although 1 clearly eXplained to them that 1 was in no way 
associated with the Georgian government they did not change their decision. Another of 
the respondents, RII who was of Ukrainian origin requested not to be recorded on tape, 
as she feared that the government might access the tape. 1 clearly explained to her that 1 
was an MA student in Communication in Canada and did not work for the Georgian 
government, and that everything she said would remain strictly confidential. Her request 
not to be recorded was respected. Sorne of the Georgian respondents among them R2, R3 
and R6 also mentioned the climate of fear, but did not have any particular requests. 
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However, they did share their belief that aIl telephone conversations in Georgia were 
recorded.3 
As mentioned above, one of the principle criterion in the selection of the respondents was 
their ethnic origin and residency in Georgia. AlI of the respondents had spent a 
considerable part of their lives residing in Georgia. From eleven respondents ten spoke 
Georgian, except the respondent RII who spoke Russian. The level of education of the 
respondents was not the principal criterion for the recruitment, but due to' the snowball 
approach, aIl eleven respondents had higher education. AIso, it is important to note that 
due to the snowball approach, the respondents belonged to two major professional fields: 
media and education. RI was ajoumalist, R2 a student injoumalism and RIO a graduate 
student in the media studies; because of their professional and academiè fields, their 
opinions on the role of media are not representative, as they had more information and 
betier insight to the media participation in the events of the Rose Revolution. In general, 
it is important to acknowledge that interviews conducted within qualitative methodology 
on a very small scale cannot be generalized and applied to aIl Georgians. The second 
group of the respondents were mainly in education: R2, R3 and R6 were university 
professors and R5, R8 and R9 were high school teachers. And finally R7 was a lawyer 
and RII a retired chemist. 
The age of the respondents varied greatly, from age 22 to age 60. We could separate 
respondents into two age groups: the first from 22 years old to 31 years old, and the 
second from 39 years old to 60 years old. Initially age was not a princip le criterion of 
selection but while analysing interview data 1 noticed that age played an important role as 
people in the same age group had a tendency to agree on same subjects and had slightly 
similar perceptions of the Rose Revolution and Georgian national identity. The gender of 
the respondents was not an important criterion, although of the eleven respondents three 
were male and eight female. 
3 Their concern can be explained by the fact that often Georgian channels, and especially Rustavi 2 air 
telephone conversations provided by the Ministry of Internai Affairs to serve as a proof of crime when 
accused is a well-known political figure arrested on corruption charges. In the three months that 1 have 
spent in Georgia in 2006, two such events took place, conceming a well- knownjoumalist and a leader of 
the opposition political party. 
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In an effort to maintain confidentiality and to preserve the independent thought process of 
participants, aIl interviews were held individuaIly. AlI eleven interviews were held in the 
capital Tbilisi and aIl participants were contacted and informed about the goals of the 
research p'rior to the commencement of the interviews. Conceming ethnical issues that 
are crucial for the research, aIl the participants were given written consent forms in 
Georgian (and in Russian for the respondent RIl) containing information conceming the 
objectives of the research, their participation, confidentiality, advantageslbenefits and 
risks, and the time required. Interviews began only after the participants were 
familiarized with the consent form containing information on goals and objectives of the 
research and signed it. Respondents were informed about the option to request that the 
interview not be tape-recorded, but as mentioned above only respondent RII chose this 
option. AlI other interviews were tape-recorded. 
Participants were informed that they could cease participation in the study at any time 
without repercussions and request that their information not to be used in the 
dissemination of results, but none of the respondents have ceased their participation or 
made requests on not using their information in the dissemination of the results. The 
confidentiality and anonymity of aIl subjects was guaranteed from the beginning of their 
participation in the study. AIl tape-recorded interviews were transcribed and coded with 
the pseudonyms by me (the principle investigator). AlI of the information regarding the 
identity of the subjects is securely kept locked in a filing cabinet in my (the Principle 
Investigator's) personal possession. The coded data with the pseudonyms and aIl 
information regarding identity of subjects will be conserved for se ven years and kept 
securely in my pers on al possession according to the ethics regulation of the University of 
Montreal.4 
Of the eleven interviews, ten Were held in Georgian and one, with the respondent RII, in 
Russian. The duration of the interviews varied approximately from Ih 30 to 2h 30 hours 
4http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/fasinfo/formulaire_ethique.htm 
http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/pdflDoc _info _ consentement.pdf 
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in average, depending on the availability of the respondents and length of their provided 
answers. As the interviews were held in Georgian and one in Russian, 1 have translated 
them into English. As the translating was done by me, 1 recognize that it might have 
introduced sorne bias. 
2.2.2. Interview themes 
Each interview consisted oftwo main parts following the practice of semi-structured 
interviews. The agenda was set thematically; the interviewees' responses were never 
restricted in any way and they were given an opportunity to elaborate upon their 
reflections. The tirst section concemed the respondent's perception of the Rose 
Revolution, with questions pertaining to the interviewee's participation in the events and 
their interpretation of these events both within and outside media contexts. In this part, 
respondents discussed what caused the Rose Revolution and what was the role of media, 
mainly Rustavi 2, within these events. Among subjects discussed were the objectivity of 
Rustavi 2 and their style of reporting. Temporal aspects were very important in this 
discussion, as these interviews were conducted three years after the conclusion of the 
Rose Revolution. Overall, at the heart ofthis section were respondents' persona] 
interpretations and opinions on the Rose Revolution, as weil as how these perceptions 
changed in the three years since the event. 
The second part of the interviews was dedicated to a discussion of Georgian national 
identity, with questions pertaining t? the subject's interpretation ofwhat it is to be 
"Georgian". Emphasis was placed on the participant's perception of "Georgian-ness" and 
how this may have been reformulated after the Rose Revolution. Further, they were asked 
to discuss how the post-Rose Revolution national identity is flagged on daily basis and 
negotiated by ordinary people. The discussion was centered around the dominant 
discourses disseminated by the media during the Rose Revolution. Respondents 
expressed their opinions on the changes to Georgian national identity they have noticed 
after the Rose Revolution and their attitude towards it. Among the issues most discussed 
was the transition from "old" to "new" Georgia disseminated by the media and supported 
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by the politicalleaders after the Rose Revolution; this transition incorporated such 
elements as European integration, unit y and national pride. The discussion of the 
transition from "old" to "new" Georgia was particularly interesting for understanding the 
process of categorization as weIl as the inc1usiveness or exc1usiveness of Georgia' s 
multiethnic reality in the post-Rose Revolution Georgian national identity. 
Due to the specificity of the qualitative data provided by the interviews, time difference 
and the small sample, interview findings cannot be generalized. They will, nevertheless, 
. complement the preceding media analysis by integrating personal commentaries and 
opinions on the post-Rose Revolution national identity. 
2.3. Conclusion 
By combining the two different methods, critical discourse analysis and semi-structured 
interviews, my goal is to explore both media and everyday experience around the 
complex process of Georgian national identity reconstruction after the Rose Revolution. 
Critical discourse analysis complemented with the minor parts of visual and gender 
analysis, is aimed at identifying and analyzing dominant discourses on Georgian national 
identity disseminated by Rustavi 2 during the Rose Revolution. In contrast, the semi-
structured interviews provide more personal insight into. the post-Rose Revolution 
national identity. Interviews balance the data provided by the critical discourse analysis 
of what has become an official vision of Georgian national identity disseminated by 
Rustavi 2 with the personal perception of Georgian national identity of the ordinary 
people who lived through the Rose Revolution. Interviews also give me an opportunity to 
reflect back upon the role of Rustavi 2 three years after the Rose . Revolution as opposed 
to the dominant vision disseminated by the media itself. 
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3. Critical discourse analysis of the media archive 
This chapter consists of a critical discourse analysis of the media coverage of the Rose"" 
Revolution, with an emphasis upon the presentation and articulation of the post-Rose 
Revolution Georgian national identity. l will discuss the dominant discourses such as 
transition from "old" to "new" Georgia and the unit y of Georgian people voiced by the 
media during the Rose Revolution and the peculiar role of Rustavi 2 in narrating these 
events. This analysis will help to explore how certain dominant interpretations of national 
identity were assigned and disseminated by the media. 
The first part ofthis chapter will be dedicated to the brief description of the Rustavi 2 
news stories on the Rose Revolution on November 22nd and 23 rd 2003. Subsequently, the 
second part ofthis chapter will be dedicated to a critical discourse analysis ofthe Rustavi 
2 coverage described in the first part ofthis chapter. Analysis will be structured 
thematically around dominant discourses on Georgian national identity flagged in Rustavi 
2; this analysis will be integrated with aspects of the press coverage and parts of the 
documentary made on the first anniversary of the Rose Revolution. 
The Rose Revolution was without a doubt the biggest media "event" in the history of 
Georgia. Starting on November 2nd 2003, when the controversial and largely contested 
parliamentary elections were held, and ending on November 23 rd 2003 with the 
resignation of the President Shevardnadze, the Rose Revolution recei ved unprecedented 
24-hour media coverage, particularly over the final two days. l will examine how the 
media covered this political crisis and how national identity was framed within it: l will 
discuss the topics and themes disseminated by the media, the strategies used to represent 
national unit y, and most importantly, how exclusiof! and inclusion were defined and 
performed. The news stories analyzed here are from November 22nd and 23 rd 2003 - the 
key dates ofthe Rose Revolution - when the political crisis reached its climax, resulting 
in peaceful resolution. By analyzing this media archive l plan to examine how the media 
framed Georgian national identity and furthennore, how the media, particularly Rustavi 
2, were implicated in this hegemonic moment of national identity construction. As the 
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media attention towards the Rose Revolution was very intense, 1 have decided to analyze 
the material of only one channel - Rustavi 2, this channel became the dominant voice 
throughout the Rose Revolution with the majority of Georgia's population following the 
events primarily through the lens of Rustavi 2. Rustavi 2 became notorious by openly 
supporting opposition forces and denouncing the corrupt and inefficient government of 
Eduard Shevardnadze. While openly supporting opposition leaders, Rustavi 2 also 
actively urged people to join the opposition forces in demanding the resignation of the 
president. An interviewee R4 related to me, during the Rose Revolution, joumalists of 
Rustavi 2 were so persistent and repetitive in urging people to join the demonstrators that 
she felt almost ashamed for not participating, she was moved to feel that this may be 
something extremely important that could change Georgia, leading it to prosperity. 
After the. Rose Revolution was over, though still in the spotlight, Rustavi 2 began to run a 
rather interesting promotional commercial claiming responsibility for the Rose 
Revolution. Not only did they bestow upon themselves this merit, they also proclaimed 
themselves as the "television of the victorious people." As ajoumalist of Rustavi 2 Dato 
Kikalishvili claimed, "if Rustavi 2 didn't provide a platform for the opposition forces to 
openly speak to the people of Georgia, the Rose Revolution wouldn't have happened as 
rapidly or reached so many people in Georgia" (Rustavi 2, People making the Revolution. 
November 2004). 
ln order to provide a fuller context of the Rose Revolution and its developments, 1 have 
integrated aspects of a documentary produced on the first anniversary of the Rose 
Revolution; this documentary presented insights into the events ofNovember 21 st, when 
thousands of people from aIl regions of Georgia came to the capital Tbilisi to support the 
oppositional forces. This moment, dubbed by the media as "the con voy of unit y" in 
reference to the convoy of cars that entered Tbilisi, was constantly invoked and framed 
by the media and politicians as the symbol of the unit y of the Georgian people. In 
addition to the documentary, 1 have also integrated sorne aspects of the Georgian press 
coverage to enrich the material and to provide insight into how the Georgian press 
covered the events of the Rose Revolution. Printed media was integrated as a 
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supplementary element to complement the discourse analysis of Rustavi 2 coverage. 1 
have analyzed five national dailyand weekly newspapers on the key dates ofNovember 
22nd and 23 Id 2003 (see annex 3 for the complete and detailed list of the newspapers). -
3.1. Description of Rustavi 2 coverage on November 22_23rd 2003 
3.1.1. Rustavi 2, N ovember 22nd 2003 
As Rustavi 2 coverage on November 22 nd 2003, was extensive and as the result rather 
repetitive 1 have decided to focus my analysis on the evening news edition - "Kurieri 
Post Scriptum" - at 9 p.m., which inc1uded aU major stories of the day on the 
developments of the Rose Revolution. This broadcast opened with the top st ory of the 
day, footage of the Parliament building as it was stormed by the opposition forces and 
their supporters. On this footage one can witness the leader of the opposition forces, 
Saakashvili, and his numerous supporters entering parliament with roses in their hands; at 
one point Saakashvili emotionally urges President Shevardnadze to resign. Surrounded 
by his twelve bodyguards, Shevardnadze at tirst refuses to interrupt his speech, but within 
minutes he is taken outside by his bodyguards. 
The top story of the day is followed by the l'no comment footage" where one camera 
follows Shevardnadze as he is taken outside, while the other, located within the 
parliament building, films the confrontation between the supporters of the opposition 
forces with the supporters of Shevardnadze. The evening news continues with live 
footage from the Rustaveli A venue, where thousands of people were celebrating the 
victory of the opposition forces. The first news story on November 22nd 2003 provided a 
detailed overview of how opposition leaders and hundreds of Georgian citizens entered 
the parliament building and how Shevardnadze was forced to flee. Following the first 
story of the evening news are statements from the resistance committee, comprised of 
intellectuals and the well-known members of the intelligentsia in Georgia. This 
committeemet with the he ad of the Christian Orthodox Church who pledged to aid in the 
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peaceful resolution of the situation and even proposed to moderate in the negotiations 
between the opposition and the President. 
The second news story, concentrates on what happened aftér the opposition leaders and 
their supporters entered the parliament. This story follows the confrontation between the 
opposition supporters and supporters of Shevardnadze. After this news story, the anchor 
mentions the visit to Georgia by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov as he 
proposed to be the moderator in the negotiations between Shevardnadze and the 
opposition. At that time it was not entirely clear whose side Ivanov and Russia would 
take: would they support Shevardnadze or opposition forces? l vanov, being half Georgian 
himself (his mother is Georgian), was seen by Shevardnadze as an appropriate candidate 
to be the moderator in the negotiations. However when Ivanov finally came to Georgia 
on November 23rd 2003, rather than meeting with Shevardnadze, he went to the 
demonstration held by the opposition supporters and there he invoked his Georgian roots 
and even spoke in Georgian, something he had never done before in public. 
The third news story on November 22nd 2003 was loaded with patriotic sentiments and 
highlighted the most important moments that had led to the seizure of parliament by the 
opposition forces. This news story was followed by the interview with Nino Burjanadze 
who had assumed the presidency after the parliament was stormed. Following the 
interview with Burjanadze, an anchor announces that Shevardnadze has issued an order 
to shut down Rustavi 2; the anchor goes on to urge viewers to help defend the channel. 
The evening news on Rustavi 2 concludes with a story on the music band and their 
artistic statement urging Shevardnadze to resign. The anchor mentions that the premiere 
of the band's Shevardnadze-inspired music video was made especially to coincide with 
the culmination of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Ending the news edition with a story 
about a political music video concludes the evening news on a lighter note. 
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3.1.2. Rustavi 2, November 23 rd 2003 
ln contrast with the previous day's news the November 23 rd Rustavi 2 coverage consisù:d 
only of live transmission throughout the day. As live transmission can be rather lengthy 
and repetitive, 1 have decided to concentrate on the key events of the day: the statement 
made by Shevardnadze on his resignation, the comments of the opposition leaders, and 
the celebrations that followed. 
After the. opposition forces stormed parliament on November 22nd 2003 and Burjanadze 
assumed the presidency it appeared that the opposition forces had prevailed; however, 
Shevardnadze had not made any statement ofhis resignation and legally remained the 
president of Georgia, that is, until the evening ofNovember 23rd 2003. But before 
Shevardnadze made his statement ofresignation one day later, rumours were circling on 
Rustavi 2 and other media sources that Shevardnadze was planning to flee Georgia for 
Germany; where according to articles in the German press he owned a luxurious villa in 
Baden-Baden. However, Shevardnadze did not leave Georgia and after meeting with 
Saakashvili on evening of November 23 fd , he resigned. As Rustavi 2 had been boycotted 
by the president throughout the Rose Revolution for its open support of the opposition 
forces, no cameras or journalists of the station were allowed to film Shevardnadze's 
statement. As a result, Shevardnadze's statement of resignation was broadcast through a 
cell phone. Rustavi 2's television bro~dcast was divided into two smaller screens: the first 
screen provided a view ofRustaveli Avenue where people were celebrating, and the 
second portrayed the president's residence from outside. As the resignation statement was 
broadcast through a cell phone, the sound quality was poor and one could hardly hear 
Shevardnadze saying: "this will not end peacefully, 1 have never betrayed my people and 
now 1 must say that it is better that the president resigns." (Rustavi 2, November 23rd 
2003). 
The coverage continued with the view on Rustaveli A venue where fireworks were going 
off. Those celebrating on Rustaveli Avenue were later joined by the opposition leaders 
44 
Saakashvili, Burjanadze , president per interim and Zvania, one of the opposition party 
leaders. 
3.2. Critical discourse analysis of the Rose Revolution media coverage 
What follows is a critical discourse analysis of Rustavi 2's media coverage on November 
22 and 2]rd 2003 with the integrated minor aspects of the press coverage and the segment 
of the Rustavi 2 documentary entitled "People make the Revolution" produced for the 
first anniversary of the Rose Revolution in 2004. 
As Stuart Hall argues, identities are constructed within (a) discourse (Hall, 1996). As we 
recognize that national identities are discursive constructs, then it is important to 
detennine what discourses influence and construct particular national identities - in this 
case Georgian national identity. As Martin puts it, "the identity narrative channels 
political emotions so that they can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power; it transfonns 
the perceptions of the past and of the present" (Martin, 1995: 13). In other words, 
political change affects national identity as different discourses are mobilized to modify, . 
enrich and present national identity as essential. 1 am interested in the discourses 
mobilized in the Rustavi 2 coverage around the post~Rose Revolution national identity, 
the strategies used to present Georgian national identity as united and essentia1, and the 
topics that were incorporated into the discursive construction of Georgian national 
identity, as weil as the peculiar role of Rustavi 2 within these events. 
3.2.1. "New" versus "old" Georgia 
In the Rose Revolution coverage the main debate around Georgian national identity was 
its transition from "old" to "new" post-Rose Revolution national identity. The discourse 
on "new" versus "old" national identity was shaped through several topics: the 
confrontation of Saakashvili and Shevardnadze; the introduction of the new national 
symbols and a refonnulation ofpolitical narrative on Georgian national identity. 
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3.2.1.1. "New" versus "old" leader 
Confrontation between Saakashvili and Shevardnadze occupied a central place in Rustàvi 
2 coverage of the Rose Revolution. In the opening footage of the storming ofthe 
parliament on November 22nd 2003 the scene of confrontation between the two leaders 
occupies an important place. The old leader Shevardnadze is portrayed as being afraid of 
his people, protected heavily by armed bodyguards, whilst the new leader Saakashvili 
embraces people. As Stephen Jones writes, Saakashvili represented everythipg the 
Georgian people wanted: "a virile, excitable and uncompromising hero with the promise 
of economic and political salvation" (Jones, 2005: 43). 
A consistently negative portrayal ofShevardnadze was perpetuated both by joumalists 
and politicalleaders in the Rustavi 2 coverage ofthe Rose Revolution on its last final two 
days. For instance, the news anchor comments in a voice-over of the opening footage of 
the evening news on November 22nd 2003: 
November 22 nd 2003 is one of the most important days in the newest history of 
Georgia as the Velvet RevolutionS Georgian style had happened! Eduard 
Shevardnadze, whose resignation has been demanded by the majority of Georgian 
citizens has greatly complicated the situation and citizens of Georgia have kicked 
him out from the Georgian parliament building. (Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 
22nd,2003). 
The choice of phrases such as "kicked out" demonstrates the extremely negative attitude 
the news anchor held towards Shevardnadze, who is blamed for the further escalating the 
situation. At the same time, Shevardnadze is denounced as a leader of Georgia and loses 
ail status in that he is "kicked out." He is portrayed as a president who has lost his power 
and has no control over the situation; this portrayal is illustrated by a camera shot in 
which Shevardnadze is grabbed by his bodyguards and taken outside like a per~on in 
retreaf at the mercy of others. The printed press also covered the incident described 
3 The term Rose Revolution emerged only on November 23 rd 2003; prior to that events in Georgia were 
entitled the Velvet Revolution. The Velvet Revolution is associated with the non- violent revolution in 
Czechoslovakia that saw the overthrow of the communist govemment that ironically occurred also in 
November 1989 in Prague. Retrieved February 15,2007, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiNelvet_Revolution 
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above: Weekly newspaper Akhali Versia, described the situation by noting that 
Shevardnadze had been "pressured by his family members not to resign as their wealth 
and position would be threatened, and it was because of this pressure that he became 
detached from reality, resulting in opposition forces storming the parliament" 
(Gotchitashvili, November 24-30, 2003: A3). 
As justification for the usage of rather s~rong words like "kicked out," the anchor of the 
evening news evokes the citizens of Georgia as the force behind the storming of 
parliament, consequently forcing Shevardnadze to flee. The citizens of Georgia are a 
large category and play an inclusive role in the categorization of aIl people living in 
Georgia, even for those who are not necessarily ethnically Georgian. This inclusion into 
the category of citizens of Georgia in opposition to Shevardnadze unifies aIl, regardless 
of differences; this statemen~ plays the role of the of the "nation binder." As mentioned 
above nation binder is a discourse that helps to construct a sense of national unit y in time 
and space, as individuals come together as a community sharing the same concerns and 
interests in the shared place at the same time (Morley and Robins, 1995). In other words, 
the nation cornes together as the citizens begin to share common concerns, often 
disseminated by the news. As Phillips argues, it is within the news that a nation 
"represents and recreates itself; there we see which issues are considered important and 
relevant and also who "we" are" (Phillips, 1995: 54). 
Shevardnadze was equally criticized and even demonized by the opposition leaders 
featured on Rustavi 2. In the first story of the November 220d evening news on the 
storming of the parliament, Burjanadze interim President blames Shevardnadze for the 
crisis and uses it as evidence that he is an unworthy leader who has betrayed his people. 
The President didn't listen to the people. The President didn't hear the citizens of 
. Georgia and the international community. He didn't make use of any chance to 
resolve this situation peacefully. He has no moral right to speak for the Georgian 
people (cited in Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 220d 2003). 
Members of the intelligentsia also largely featured in the evening news Kurieri Post 
Scriptum described Shevardnadze as a despot. For instance, the Georgian writer Aka 
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Morchiladze noted, "people celebrate the end of the 30 - year rule6, the Old Georgia and 
despot Shevardnadze are gone" (cited in Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 22nd 2003). 
By "the Old Georgia" Morchiladze is referring to two ethnic conflicts and a civil war that 
shattered Georgia with extreme po vert y and the corruption of Government officiaIs, 
among them Shevardnadze's family7. One of the main reasons why Shevardnadze was 
described as a despot is due to his strong association with the Soviet Heritage, 
particularly with Russia. While president of Georgia, Shevardnadze did nothing to 
deserve being described as a despot; however, the same cannot be said about his early 
career as the first secretary of the Georgian Communist party under the USSR. Therefore 
Shevardnadze was an integral part of the "old" Georgia, the Soviet Georgia that 
everybody wanted to forget. 
For Gramsci, the role of intelligentsia and intellectuals "is important in producing, 
mai~taining and circulating ideologies that bec orne natur~lized as common sense" 
(Gramsci cited in Barker, 2003: 406). In other words, they have the power to influence 
the common sense by introducing new discourses. As Milan Kundera writes on 
Communist societies: "in the political jargon of the day, "intellectual" was an expletive 
and described a pers on who failed to understand life and was cut off from the people" 
(Kundera, 1980: 5). In other words, intellectuals were described as idealists who could 
not grasp the harsh reality of life. This attitude towards intellectuals was at large 
throughout the USSR, and as a Communist leader of Georgia Shevardnadze was keen on 
reducing the civilliberties of intellectuals. However, in the post-Communist Georgia 
situation changed, opinions of the members of intelligentsia are influential and they 
formed an important force against Shevardnadze, and were frequently featured in the 
Rustavi 2 coverage of the Rose Revolution. 
It is crucial to clarify that Shevardnadze has been portrayed quite differently in the West. 
For the West, Shevardnadze is one of the key figures behind the "Perestroika" and the 
demolition of the Berlin wall. Shevardnadze was a key ally to Mikhail Gorbachev as the 
6 Eduard Shevardnadze was the first secretary of the communist party ofGeorgia during the Soviet Union 
and in 1990s became the second president of the independent Georgia. . 
7 Shevardnadze's family is considered as one of the wealthiest families in Georgia. 
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Minister of the Foreign affairs ofUSSR. Later when he became the president of Georgia, 
<> 
Western countries considered him as a representative of democracy and stability in war-
tom Georgia. However, within Georgia his image was radically different: He was never 
able to rid himself ofhis Soviet past and for most Georgians, he will forever be 
associated with the Kremlin and the Soviet Union. During the events of the Rose 
Revolution, one of the politicalleaders of Communist Georgia - Givi Patiashvili - went 
so far as to blame Shevardnadze for the events of April 9th , 1989, when the Soviet Army 
attacked peaceful demonstrators in Georgia; According to Patiashvili, it was 
Shevardnadze who gave the orders to attack the people. Shevardnadze was also largely 
. blamed for ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During his presidency, he did 
not manage to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia, a policy attributed to his "soft" 
politics towards Russia. 
Togçther with being harshly criticized for unsuccessful years of post-Soviet Georgia, 
Shevardnadze was ridiculed by the joumalists of Rustavi 2 and presented as a fallen 
leader who was unable to make his own decisions and unable to control the situation. 
This is weIl illustrated by the footage on the storming of the parliament when 
Shevardnadze was taken outside by his bodyguards to his supporters' demonstration, with 
a large number of govemment officiaIs following him. In the Rustavi 2 evening news 
Shevardnadze's actions were always referredto as passive: he "was taken" outside, not 
he went outside; this indicates that Shevardnadze lost his status of the leader. While 
meeting his supporters, Shevardnadze seemed very emotional and lost: in close-up, we 
can see that he was extremely pale and ev en shaking. Shevardnadze told his supporters 
that he knew that the opposition forces had an intention to storm the parliament building, 
but that he·had said everything he wanted to say. His statement appeared rather illogical, 
and redundant; he was unable to formulate his ideas and repeated himself several times. 
An example ofthis absurdity is that Shevardnadze talked about economic development in 
Georgia, something that was nonexistent at that time. As the respondent R6 1 interviewed 
recalled, it appeared as though somebody had written Shevardnadze's bizarre speech with 
the purpose of making it obvious that he was an old man who had no idea what was 
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happening in his country - he was completely detached from reality. In other words, it 
was broadcast to expose him to ridicule. 
Unlike Shevardnadze, Saakashvili received exceptionally positive media coverage. One 
of the examples ofthis is the first news story of the November 22nd evening news 
describing how opposition forces and their supporters headed to the Parliament building. 
From the story one gathers that the plan of storming parliament was extremely well 
organized: one group that included the leader of one of the opposition parties, Zurab 
Zvania8 headed to the parliament's main entrance, while Saakashvili and his supporters 
headed to the back entrance. On their way to parliament, Saakashvili's group was 
confronted by the Minister of Interior affairs; this encounter erupted into a powerful 
scene of confrontation that established SaakashviIi as a true, brave, and fearless leader. 
The depiction of this confrontation is reminiscent of a mythic tale in which a hero fights 
for his people's rights and prevails in the face of the villain. In contrast to Shevardnadze, 
who is al ways filmed surrounded by heavily armed bodyguards, Saakashvili's proximity 
to people defines his style of leadership for the "new European style Georgia". 
Shevardnadze was never a leader who interacted with his people and his style of 
leadership consistently carried Communist features associated with his prior political 
career: he came to embody the "old" Georgia. . 
The scene between Saakashvili and the Minister of Interior Affairs is one of the examples 
ofhow masculinity and virility was accentuated and even privileged, in that Saakashvili 
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was not afraid to take the risk of entering parliament alongside his supporters. As Jackie 
Stacey argues: 
"In popular cultural narrative it is the male protagonist who takes a number of 
risks in the name of truth, justice, morality or love and by overcoming the 
negative forces in favour ofthese principles, he achieves a heroic stature which 
. we might aIl admire or even aspire to. These are heroes that enable us to trust 
ourselves and our judgement, to know we are right" (Stacey, 1997 :8). 
S Zurab Zvania became the prime minister in 2004 and died in 2005 under rather mysterious circumstances 
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In the case of the Rose Revolution, it is Mikheil Saakashvili, or "Misha" as his supporters 
call him, who occupies this niche of male protagonist, the hero that fights for justice and 
truth. He is the ultimate male hero who is admired by thousands and is se en by them as 'a 
fighter for their prosperity and well-being, the hero who willliberate Georgia from the 
villain Shevardnadze. 
In the Rustavi 2 coverage Saakashvili waspresented not only as a hero but also as the 
main decision maker behind the opposition forces. It was Saakashvili, not Bl1rjanadze 
herself, who dec1ared that Burjanadze, the speaker of Parliament, would assume the 
presidency until new elections were held. With this portrayal of Saakashvili, one can 
c1early see the general shift of power from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili, as he takes the 
place of leader by stripping the president of his title, even though Shevardnadze legally 
remained the president of Georgia until his resignation on November 23 rd 2003. Overall 
the confrontation between the "old" and "new" leader came to represent the struggle of 
Georgia to overcome a post-Soviet heritage associated with Shevardnadze and to adopt 
new European style political orientation represented by Saakashvili. 
3.2.1.2. New national symbols 
New national symbols were introduced one year later in 2004, with Saakashvili's arrivaI 
to mark the beginning of the post-Rose Revolution era. New national symbols inc1uding 
the flag, the national anthem, and the coat of arms replaced the old national symbols, 
effectively detaching the Georgian national identity from the "old" Georgia marked by 
poverty, civil war and ethnic conflicts; In contrast, the new symbols were associated 
mai nI y with the Rose Revolution and the peaceful Georgia. 
It was during the Rose Revolution that these new symbols became prominent. For 
'instance, in the Rustavi 2 portrayal of the opposition forces was inseparable from the 
omnipresent new five cross flag. In the second news story of the evening news on 
November 22nd 2003, which provided a detailed overview ofwhat happened after the 
opposition forces entered parliament, the new five cross flag occupied a central place. 
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The news story concentrated on the confrontation of the opposition supporters and 
supporters of Shèvardnadze. In this struggle opposition supporters are identified by the 
five cross flag that each ofthem carries whereas Shevardnadze's supporters carry 
Georgia's old flag. Saakashvili's supporters were portrayed as fighters for justice-
citizens who wanted to regain rights that had been jeopardized by fraudulent elections; in 
contrast Shevardnadze's supporters were portrayed as armed, angry and uncontrolled. As 
opposed to the opposition movement, supporters of Shevardnadze were never referred to 
as Georgian citizens but as people paid for supporting Shevardnadze; their discursive 
framing differs in that they threaten the fragile unit y of the Georgian people as presented 
by the Rustavi 2. 
In the media discourse, the new flag was situated as the five-cross flag used by the 
Georgian Kingdom in the 12th century A.D., a time described as the Golden Age of 
Georgia. This association of the new flag with the Georgian Golden Age discursive1y 
marks the beginning of the "new" Golden Age symbolized by the Rose Revolution and a 
new era of prosperity for Georgia. At the same time this was an attempt to leave behind 
the events that the old flag represented alongside the "old" Georgia. 
3.2.1.3. Political Narratives 
The reformulation of the political narrative of Georgian national identity in Rustavi 2 
coverage occupied an important place in the transition from "old" to "new" Georgia. By 
emphasizing the negative elements of Georgia's post-Soviet years, this media discourse 
used a selective mobilization ofhistory; the Rose Revolution was invoked as the new 
beginning that would lead to the prosperity and unity. One of the important elements 
consolidated in the new political narrative was the new-found unit y of the Georgian 
people generated by the Rose Revolution. This unit y was flagged in the third news story 
of the evening news on November 22nd 2003. This story opens with a view of Liberty 
Square where we can see thousands of people standing together and waving flags. This 
vision was of a united Georgia that both opposition leaders and joumalists emphasized 
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many times, and consequently, it became one of the main forces behind the Rose 
Revolution. 
After almost twelve years of independence, Georgia was divided by two unresolved 
ethnic conflicts, civil war, and extreme poverty for the majority of the population. At the 
same time, sorne people (especially government officiaIs and their families) became 
extremely wealthy and the unit y that everybody aspired ta never materialized. During the 
Rose Revolution many people in Georgia started believing that this was the moment for a 
fresh start, where past troubles were put behind. This belief was very much sustained by 
media and political discourse. 
ln the third news story of the evening news on November 22nd ajournalist begins the 
story by describing how thousands of people from aIl over Georgia came ta Tbilisi in 
arder ta participate in the cr:ucial fight initiated by the opposition after the fraudulent 
parliamentary elections of November 2nd 2003. Thejoumalist's lead sentence is followed 
by comments from the opposition leader Saakashvili, who delivers an extremely patriotic 
speech, where he salutes patriots that came ta the capital Tbilisi and mentions aIl the 
regions of Georgia. Saakashvili's ode ta patriots reminded me of a poem that 1 leamed in 
the first grade. In this poem, similar ta Saakashvili's speech, all regions are mentioned, 
and it concludes with the phrase "aIl ofthem are my homeland, my beloved Georgia." 
From my knowledge of this poem, its intention is ta teach children that while aIl regions 
of Georgia may be different, there are essential thing they share, as aIl are a part of 
Georgia. 
The fact that the people from the regions of Georgia came ta Tbilisi, was crucial ta the 
discourse of unit y of the Georgian people. One of the moments that expressed the 
ultimate unit y of the Georgian nation was on November 21 st, wh en thousands of people 
led by Saakashvili entered Tbilisi ta demand the resignation of President Shevardnadze. 
The powerful footage of hundreds of cars entering the city at night ta be greeted by 
residents of Tbilisi as heroes was the climax of unit y for the Georgian nation and has 
been repeatedly flagged by the media and politicians. In the interviews conducted as a 
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dimension of my research, this moment was evoked most often as the strongest and the 
most memorable moment of the Rose Revolution. The image of the convoy of cars 
entering Tbilisi as they carry the new five-cross flag was and still is very actively flaggêd 
by the media as the crucial element of the "new" Georgia, introduced after the Rose 
Revolution. 
Interestingly, this has not been the tirst time such an image was used to invoke the 
changing tide of a nation. In a documentary entitled "Bringing down the dictator," which 
follows the events of Serbia's 2000 fraudulent elections when then-president Slobodan 
Milosevic was overthrown, the very same scene was depicted: a convoy of cars and 
buses that carried supporters of the opposition to Belgrade. Interestingly, this 
documentary was broadcast by Rustavi 2 several times prior to the contested 
parliamentary elections of November 2nd 2003 and after the conclusion of the Rose 
Revolution (Anable, 2006). 
Saakashvili also recalled the "convoy of cars" as the moment of unit y that did not exist 
before the Rose Revolution in a Rustavi 2 documentary made on the tirst anniversary of 
the Rose Revolution: 
This event was completely different from those of 1991, when residents of Tbilisi 
didn't accept people from other regions; this time they greeted them like heroes! 
This was very important to me as we proved that Georgia is united (People making 
the Revolution, November 2004). 
Here, Saakashvili invokes the events of 1991 that were originally rather similar to those 
ofNovember 2003, but he refuses to make any links - instead denying them. The early 
1990s and especially 1991 has been characterized as negative time in the history of 
Georgia, marked by civil and ethnic conflicts. Similar to the events of November 2003, a 
1991 political confrontation arose between the first president of Georgia - Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia - and his opposition. Yet differently from the Rose Revolution, the 1991 
political tension translatedinto a violent confrontation that has come to define the "old 
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Georgia" - something that Saakashvili and his supporters wanted to put behind them with 
the help 'of the Rose Revolution. 
Zurab Zvania, one of the leaders of the united opposition and the person who renamed the 
Velvet Revolution in Georgia the Rose Revolution also framed the Rose Revolution as 
the new beginning for Georgia: liA new day has come for Georgia. This is the day that 
will bring happiness, wealth, peace and prosperity." (Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 
22nd 2003). 
~ 
Similarily, Burjanadze also emphasized the new-found unit y: 
Nobody can thnbaten Georgia's unit y; nothing will ever destroy the unit y of 
. Georgia! AU the refugees that are here with us today will go back to their homes, aU 
of us will go back to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We will live in a developed, 
peaceful, successful and democratic Georgia, we will build this Georgia! ( Kurieri 
Post Scriptum, November 22nd 2003). 
Burjanadze is the first politicalleader to mention the thousands of refugees from 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who were fleeing ethnic conflicts during the early 1990s. 
These refugees were forgotten for many years and the only reminder of them was the 
Hotel Iveria in the downtown Tbilisi where groups of the refugees lived. Once one of the 
best hotels in Tbilisi, it had been transformed into something dreadful that for many 
symbolized the Georgia of Shevardnadze - the "old" Georgia. Later when Saakashvili 
was elected as president in February 2004, refugees were evicted and given financial 
compensation. In place of Hotel Iveria a Radisson SAS hotel is being constructed. In her 
speech, Burjanadze invokes a "new" Georgia that will regain its territorial integrity. The 
two ethnic conflicts that spawned this mass of refuges had resulted in breakaway regions 
and left thousands of people displaced. Promise of the restoration of territorial integrity 
played a crucial role within Georgia's post-Rose Revolution national identity. In the 
construction of national identities, territorial attachment to the land is very important as 
"identity is understood by who we are and where we are" (Hujanen, & Pietikainen, 2003: 
254). As Sennett elaborates, "a sense of place derives from the need to belong to a 
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particular place, home. In satisfying this need for roots, people make commitments to 
localities" (Sennett, 1999: 15). 
Restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia is part of the "new different Georgia" 
that Burjanadze had promised. She invoked these ethnie conflicts, though later dismissed 
them for the sake of a new unified Georgia. Bhabha writes about "a strange forgetting of 
the history ofa nation's past," it is this forgetting that "constitutes the beginning of the 
nation's narrative" (Bhabha, 1990: 310). Sometimes remembering is evoked in order to 
forget, as was the case of Burjanadze's speech: she recalls previous events, white 
abstaining from elaborating upon them, and subsequently dismisses them in the name of 
the "new" Georgia which is always invoked within a European context as opposed to that 
ofthe US SR. As Milan Kundera argues, 
"People are al ways shouting that they want to create a better future. This is not 
true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is full of 
life, eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. 
The only reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past" 
(Kundera, 1980: 22). 
In her speech, Burjanadze also mentions that "nobody Can threaten the unit y of Georgia." 
The abstract "no body" is either an internaI or external enemy that serves to reinforce the 
Georgian peoples' determination to stay united. But the unity ofwhich Burjan.adze 
speaks is purely discursive, a part of her political populist perfonnance that is designed to 
persuade and convince people that this was indeed the beginning of a new and different 
Georgia (Chambers, Johnson, Raghuram, & Tincknell, 2004). A discourse on the 
political narrative of Georgia was omnipresent during the Rose Revolution, but at the 
same time was very selective in its recollection of events. "Bad times," such as civil war 
and ethnic conflicts, were invoked to describe the "old" Georgia associated with 
Shevardnadze, while "good times" were invoked to describe the "new" Georgia, a rebirth 
of the good times. 
In the third news story on November 22nd , ajournalist al~o stresses the unity of the 
Georgian people by mentioning citizens who came to support the opposition from 
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different parts of Georgia. The joumalist goes on to note that sorne of the people gathered 
on the Liberty Square were the same people who were there in 1989, when the liberation 
movement against the Soviet Union reached its climax in Georgia. On April 9th 1989, 
students participating in a peaceful demonstration against the Soviet Government were 
attacked by the Soviet army, resulting in the deaths 20 people. This incident generated 
strong resistance and massive hatred of the Soviet govemment, which was expressed 
through weeks of demonstrations. The Kremlin tried to stop these demonstrations through 
the use of chemical gases, but rather than dissipating the situation, the Kremlin's decision 
caused it to escalate, with the following months being rife with ever-greater 
demonstrations. This was the moment in Georgia's history when everybody wanted the 
same thing - the independence of Georgia. The joumalist invokes these demonstrations 
as à sign that Georgians were united once before; but she neglects to mention the events 
following independence when Georgia became mired in political crises and civil war. 
This news story serves as a prime example of the selective mobilization of history, when 
certain events are brought up and others forgotten. 
3.2.2. Unit y 
During the Rose Revolution, media discourse on unit y of the Georgian nation occupied a 
central place. Explicitly flagged in the political narrative, unit y was also emphasized 
through Christianity and Georgian culture. In this section, I will discuss how Christianity 
and Georgian culture were mobilized by Rustavi 2 in the tale ofunity. 
3.2.2.1. Christianity 
The discourse on 'Christianity was omnipresent in the Rose Revolution coveragè of 
Rustavi 2 as a unifying factor for ail Georgians. This do es not come as a surprise as 
Christianity, particularly Christian Orthodox religion, has historically been accentuated as 
an integral part ofGeorgian-ness and Georgian nationalistic ideology. As mentioned in 
chapter one, the philosopher Mamardashvili argues, that Christianity was the main force 
in transforming Georgians from an ethnic group into a nation (Mamardashvili, 2003). 
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After aU, Georgians adopted Christianity as the state religion as early as in 337 A.D.,' 
with two apostles of Jesus - Andrew and Simon the Canaanite - coming to Georgia to 
preach. 
Throughout the coverage of the Rose Revolution the Christian Orthodox Church was 
represented as the unique force capable of unifying aU Georgians, the force that could 
reconcile the two hostile camps. Throughout the Rustavi 2 evening news on November 
22nd and 23 rd the head of the Georgian Christian Orthodox Church, Ilya II, was mentioned 
frequently and his statements were broadcasted twice. The same statement was published 
in the weekly newspaper Kviris Palitra: 
We are the unifying force of the Georgian nation. Today more than ever Georgia 
needs a unifying force and this force was and always will be the Georgian 
Orthodox Church (K viris Palitra, November 17-23, 2003: Al). 
This statement appears to be rather controversial, in that while the Georgian Orthodox 
church might weil be the unifying force for Orthodox Georgians, it excludes aIl those 
who are not Christian or religious at aIl. This statement 1S at the same time inclusive for 
Christian Orthodox Georgians and exclusive for aIl "other" Georgians. In this case, only 
people sharing the Christian Orthodox religion have been taken into account, whereas 
others have been completely ignored. 
By invoking Christianity as the unifying factor, Georgian national identity is completely 
detached from its Communist past, which rejected Christianity, and instead makes links 
with glorious times in Georgian history such as the Golden Age in the 12th century A.D. 
Without invoking Christianity, the discourse on the unit y of the Georgian national 
identity would be less credible and appealing to people, as Christianity is largely 
unquestioned and has been accepted easily in Georgia. For instance, in the footage of the 
stormfng of the parliament, we see thousands of people walking towards the parliament 
building with the person leading the crowd carrying massive wooden cross; the cross 
symbolizes this march as a crusade against evil and the corrupt government of 
Shevardnadze. The cross symbolized the good and noble intentions of the demonstrators. 
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Saakashvili, the leader of the opposition forces invoked Christianity in the majority of bis 
speeches broadcast on Rustavi 2. On November 22nd he announced that the head of the 
Christian Orthodox church of Georgia had refused to bless the illegitimate parliament. 
"The church is on our side, the law is on our side, the world is on our side and now we 
have 10' start rebuilding our country" (Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 22nd 2003). 
With this speech, Saakashvili performs the act of boundary-making, crucial in defining 
and maintaining a national identity: the statement discursively includes Christian 
Orthodox Georgians and excludes others who are not Christian Orthodox (mainly ethnic 
minorities, Armenians, Azeri, Ossetians and so on); it also defines religion and 
Christianity as an important element of Georgian national identity. At the same, time 
Saakashvili employs the word "our" a larger category inclusive of aIl Georgian citizens, 
not solely those that are Christian Orthodox. Through this act, Saakashvili "flaggs 
homeland." As Billig explains, by "flagging homeland", national identity is made 
omnipresent, but at the same time natural as it is presented as a part of a context (Billig, 
1995). The usage of words such as "our" and "we" is part of "flagging homeland," as 
the se words are largely unquestioned .and are used to establish boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion in a national context (Billig, 1995). This process of boundary making is 
subject to temporal and ideological elements that are in constant flux, therefore these 
boundaries are constantly shifting. 
On November 23 rd 2003, the discourse on Christianity was reinforced as this is St. 
George's day in Georgia. St. George was mentioned numerous times both in TV and 
press coverage - al ways in suggestion that the political confrontation had to be resolved 
on this special day as only good things happen on St. George's day. As Saakashvili put it: 
"St. George's day for me is the day ofvictory of good over evil. God is on our side. The 
evil corrupted government and Shevardnadze have to resign! St. George's day has to 
come in a free Georgia" (24 Saati, November 23,2003: Al). 
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In other words, Saakashvili translated political confrontation into a symbolic or mythic 
one, where evil was represented as Shevardnadze and his entourage and good was 
everything that the opposition forces stood for, blessed by St. George and God. The status 
of St. George is very important as he is considered the patron saint of Georgia and on 
both religious and politicallevels is considered as the symbol ofresistance and victory. 
One of the opposition leaders, Zviad Dzidziguri, even proclaimed aH opposition forces as 
knights of St. George (Rezonansi, November 22,2003: A3); in this way he draws a 
symbolic link between St. George defeating the dragon and opposition forces defeating 
Eduard Shevardnadze. 
On November 23 rd after the Rose Revolution reached a peaceful culmination Saakashvili 
noted that this event ending on St. George's day marked the symbolic beginning of the 
newera: 
Today our nation has won. Happy St. George's day! This is one of the greatest 
days in the history of Georgia, this is the birth of the new Georgia~ We aH must 
stand together so that the new Georgia can be prosperous and different. This 
revolution that we have aH made, a revolution that we had promised to the world, 
has ended with the victory of Georgian people! (Rustavi 2, November 23 rd 2003). 
Today St. George is largely present in the national symbols of Georgia: it is his image 
that is central to Georgia' s new coat of arms, in addition to St. George's cross being the 
central element of the nation's new "five-cross flag." As Chkeidze writes, "St. George led 
the way to the victorious and glorious Georgia that we hope and dream to restore one 
day" (Chkeidze, 2002: 105). In other words, St. George became the symbol of a 
prospero us Georgia and with the Rose Revolution ending on St. George's day it 
symbolicaHy marked the beginning of the new era. 
3.2.2.2. Georgian culture 
In the Rustavi 2 coverage of the Rose Revolution, discourse on Georgian culture 
occupied an important place as it marked the unit y of Georgian people and participated in 
the boundary making by differentiating Georgians from "others." The last news story of 
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the evening news on November 22nd 2003 explores a Georgian way of dealirig with 
things through culture. The news story follows the making pfthe artistic statement urging 
Shevardnadze to resign. The news story opens with archivai footage of Shevardnadze as 
the leader of the Communist party of Georgia and moves on to show the musicians 
working in the studio, where one ofthem - a famous singer known as Ucnobi - notes that 
this is a historic moment in the making. The musicians go on to comment that they had 
been preparing their music video for the resignation of Shevardnadze, but as the events 
progressed more rapidly than expected after the opposition supporters entered the 
parliament, the y had to finish it as rapidly as possible. As the musicians elaborate, the key 
lyrics oftheir song "come to your senses" is addressed to Shevardnadze and represents 
the spiritual state of every single Georgian. 
The music video is composed offootage of Shevardnadze, from his career as the 
chairman of the Communist party of Georgia, to his later tenure as president of Georgia. 
The video is framed in the genre of comedy. In one particular scene, the camera zooms in 
on a girl who has the caricaturized face of Shevardnadze painted on the back pocket of 
her jeans, depicting him as the object of a joke, someone who is no longer taken 
seriously. 
In an interview the director of the video notes that while making the music video, they 
needed strong visual material alongside archive footage of Shevardnadze that could 
demonstrate how strongly his resignation was desired. They decided to use the November 
21 st 2003 material when the convoy of cars from the different regions of the Georgia had 
entered Tbilisi in support of the opposition forces. The creators of the music video also 
emphasized that their video was constructed in a uniquely Georgian style, addressing the 
political crisis through humour and music. This unique Georgian style has once more 
been mobilized to reinforce the Georgian national identity as something different from 
everything else. Many Georgian philosophers have addressed this cultural trend of 
blending tragedy and comedy. Boris Pasternak defined Georgian culture as an unusual 
mixture of deep tragedy and endless festivity (Pasternak cited in Asatiani, 1990). As 
Asatiani writes, this duaHty is a central element in Georgian national identity, as it 
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conveys the Georgian soul with its internaI conflicts better than anything else (Asatiani, 
1990). 
Cultural elements were also strongly present in the demonstrations he Id during the Rose 
Revolution, beginning with music and dances and finishing with poetry. In a way, the 
demonstrations resembled theatrical performance with famous Georgian poets and actors 
delivering performances in the celebration ofunity, creating festive atmosphere during 
the Rose Revolution. 
In the printed press, the discourse on Georgian national identity was also shaped mai nI y 
through Georgian culture and traditions. Overall, Georgian culture and folklore were 
evoked stressing the unique Georgian style of resistance. The discourse on Georgian 
culture and its unique character was invoked to reinforce Georgian national identity and 
to situate it in relation to others. 
3.2.3. Elimination of differences 
3.2.3.1. Ethnic minorities 
In general, Rustavi 2 coverage of the Rose Revolution was oriented towards the 
emergence of the new post-Rose Revolution Georgia and the new-found unit y within 
Georgians elements that might have threatened this vision were completely eliminated 
and silenced. In my analysis, 1 have discovered a significant discursive gap concerning 
the question of ethnic minorities in Georgia. As Foucault explains, "disconti.nuity is 
manifested through discursive gaps and is the underlying reality of aU discursive 
statements" (Foucault, 1972: 37). In other words, in order to create the vision of unit y 
certain discourses are eliminated and form discursive gaps. In this partieular research 
ethnic question was identified as a discursive gap. 
From the beginning of my research 1 was interested to explore if the construction of the 
new Georgian national identity had been inc1usive of the ethnie minorities present in 
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Georgia, as well as how these ethnic minorities were represented during the Rose 
Revolution. l was astonished to discover that Rustavi 2 did not mention the ethnic 
minorities during their extensive coverage of the Rose Revolution. The situation was 
almost identical in the printed press, with only one article bringing up the question of 
ethnic minorities and their position during the Rose Revolution. Published in a weekly 
newspaper Kviris Palitra, an article entitled "The non-Georgian population will not 
engage in the political confrontation" discussed the passivity of ethnic minorities during 
the political crisis (Devidze, November 17-23,2003: A6). As the joumalist noted, the 
political crisis did not escalate in regions largely populated by ethnic minorities; 
throughout the Rose Revolution the political climate remained calm in these are as as 
none of the political parties had tried to gamer support from the non-Georgian 
population. According to an unidentified source cited in this article, the reason for this is 
that ethnic minorities in Georgia have always preferred to stay neutral during political 
crises. He goes on to state that ethnic minorities are ready to support any political force 
that will guarantee a peaceful and calm situation in Georgia. Most importantly though, 
this unidentified source presents the notion that ethnic minorities may abstain from 
supporting any political party as through their participation, they may be objectified and 
targeted as the source of the crisis (Devidze, November 17-23, 2003: A6). Does this 
mean that ethnic minorities in Georgia can't express their political views freely and that 
none of the political parties are interested in acquiring the support from ethnic minorities? 
As the above article lacks precision and therefore credibility, it is difficult to conclude 
that ethnic minorities are indeed passive in making their political choices. However, l 
discovered no other articles or television footage in my research which address the 
question of the ethnic minorities and their participation in this event. Consequently one 
might wonder whether the topic of ethnic minorities was silenced, as it held the potential 
to threaten the fragile unit y of the Georgian national identity flagged by the media and 
found ,within political discourse. l will retum to this key question in the interview chapter. 
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3.2.3.2. "Ordinary" people 
Also largely absent in the Rustavi 2 coverage of the Rose Revolution were ordinary 
Georgians who either participated in the demonstrations or chose to stay neutral 
throughout these events. It seems rather odd that in the news stories featured on 
November 22nd and 23 rd there were no interviews with the ordinary people: particularly 
those who together with Saakashvili seized the parliament building. The only people 
accorded the right to be heard on Rustavi 2 were the leaders of the united opposition, 
mainly Saakashvili and members of intelligentsia. Usually, in Rustavi 2 coverage 
interviews with ordinary individuals occupy a central place. The Rose Revolution has 
always been described as "the people's event," 1 find il peculiar that those people who 
stood in the streets ofTbilisi for weeks and seized the parliarnent were never given the 
opportunity to speak and were completely ignored. Always portrayed as the masses, we 
do not see individuals at all, just people who think the sarne way and want the same 
thing. Perhaps interviews from ordinary individuals would have darnaged the fragile 
unit y of the Georgian nation, which was actively emphasized in media and political 
discourse. It may go without saying that aIl people in support of the Rose Revolution and 
against it were different, having different expectations; however, this difference can 
threaten a fragile unity. As Seyla Benhabib writes "what is shocking [ ... ] is not the 
/ 
inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that they display but rather the atavistie belief 
that identities ean be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and 
othemess" (Benhabib, 1996: 3). 
Overall, In Rustavi 2's coverage, citizens of Georgia are used as an impersonal general 
category; in contrast, in the printed press, citizens of Georgia are actually given a VOlee. 
An article printed in 24 Saati entitled "These people carne here on their own," describes 
ordinary people and their emotions, opinions and hopes. As one ofthe participants of the 
demonstration explains, "here you feel that you are Georgian. 1 was holding a flag and 1 
understood how much 1 love my homeland, 1 never felt it before" (Bukia, N ovember 22, 
2003: A3). Inclusion of comments like this helped to shape the rather abstract concept of 
Georgian national identity, in this case expressed by the flag and people coming together 
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in a struggle for justice. In the same article the Georgian folk music largely present 
during the demonstrations is described as the generator of the patriotic mood, enabling 
the Georgian-ness. Another participant also reflects on the notion ofhomeland: 
"homeland is abstract, you can't touch it, but during this one week home land was in these 
people that stood here for days under the rain and snow" (Bukia, November 22,2003: 
A3). Unlike Rustavi 2, 24 Saati adds human touches to their stories, including a large 
cross-section of Georgian Citizens with their individual reflections on homeland. In the 
same article, love of homeland is represented through toasting, something that is indeed 
an important part of Georgian culture; this element was also incorporated into the 
demonstrations (Bukia, November 22,2003: A3). Although, like Rustavi 2, the printed 
press did not elaborate on the people that opposed the Rose Revolution, but they did 
include the opinions and expectations of the "ordinary" people that believed in the Rose 
Revolution. 
3.2.4. Rustavi 2 and the Rose Revolution 
It is impossible to discuss the Rose Revolution without examining the peculiar role of 
Rustavi 2 in these events. By actively covering the events of the Rose Revolution Rustavi 
2 played a prominent role in fixing common sense meanings around the Rose Revolution 
and the hegemonic moment of nation construction. 
For instance in the evening news of November 22nd, the anchor introduced the day's top 
news on the storming of parliament as follows: 
Good evening, on this peaceful evening ofNovember 22nd 2003, reporters of 
Rustavi 2 and l will tell you the details oftoday's historie day. (Kurieri Post 
Scriptum, November 22nd 2003). 
The ward "historie" is used as a joumalist reiterates the historie value to the events. As 
Gramsci has argued, "traditional intellectuals" - which include the employees of media, 
among them joumalists "maintain and circulate ideologies constitutive of hegemony 
that become naturalized as common sense" (Gramsci cited in Barker, 2003: 406). In other 
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words, Gramsci argues that the struggle over hegemony is led by common sense. As 
Billig elaborates, media plays an important role in fixing common sense meanings by 
"simultaneously speaking to and for the nation in both senses ofrepresentation" (Billig, 
1995: 115). As we can see here, the anchor accords an historic value to the event and 
presents it as a natural and unquestionable occurrence that must be viewed in terms of 
common sense, which cannot be questioned. The anchor has therefore participated in the 
media construction of hegemony, that is, the hegemonic moment of nation construction. 
From this point on, November 22nd 2003 will continue to be seen as an historic moment 
for the Georgian nation, a point of change and transformation. Put more succinctly, the 
Rose Revolution was disseminated by the media as the historic moment that has shaped 
and will continue to shape Georgian history and identity. 
By openly taking the side of the opposition forces, Rustavi 2 occupied dominant place 
among other media in the coverage ofthe Rose Revolution. As an example ofthis 
domination is the live footage from the Rustaveli Avenue featured in the evening news on 
November 22nd 2003. In the live footage a reporter mentions that the people gathered on 
Rustaveli Avenue wanted to be informed about what was happening in other parts of 
Tbilisi9 and demanded (should it be possible) the installation of a giant screen on 
Rustaveli Avenue where the y could watch Rustavi 2. A giant screen projecting Rustavi 2 
was installed the very same day. During the Rose Revolution for the opposition 
supporters Rustavi 2 represented the privileged source of information; it was seen to be 
the channel that told the "truth" about Georgia and the development ofthe Rose 
Revolution. ln other words, Rustavi 2 occupied a niche of the TV market watched 
exclusively by opposition supporters. Rustavi 2 harshly criticized Channel 110 for 
supporting the government, accusing it of becoming a propaganda tool for Shevardnadze 
and his team. In a way, however, Rustavi 2 became the propaganda tool for the 
opposition forces. As Saakashvili noted, Rustavi 2 "was extremely important. lt was 
instrumental in the Rose Revolution" (cited in Anable, 2006: 15). 
9 DurÎng the Rose RevolutÎon demonstratÎons were held in several places, the major ones were on Rustaveli 
Avenue and Liberty square, as weil as near the office of the Ruistavi 2. 
10 The Public Broadcasting of Georgia that during the Soviet times was the ol)ly Government channel. 
66 
Rustavi 2 was indeed instrumental in disseminating and generating the discourse on unit y 
of the Georgian people. By emphasizing the unit y of the Georgian people and painting 
the situation in light of the tale of unity. In another example taken from the live footage" in 
the evening news on November 22nd 2003, a reporter, surrounded by revelers gathered on 
Rustaveli Avenue celebrating the storming of the parliament by the opposition forces 
noted: "The people gathered here tonight are enjoying being together: they are united in 
feeling that they have achieved something and that situation will change in this country." 
(Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 22nd 2003) 
The discourse of unit y was omnipresent both during and after the Rose Revolution. 
Dnity is essential to the common vision of national identity, and is always represented as 
something extremely natural. The unit y accentuated by Rustavi 2 was created 
discursively in order to mask inherent differences. As Hall argues, 
"instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, we should think of them as a 
discursive device that represents difference as unit y or identity. They are cross-
cut by deep internaI divisions and "unified" only thought the exerCÎse of different 
forms of cultural power" (Hall cited in Barker, 2004: 254). 
As power mechanisms assure the visibility ofunity, we can clearly see that while 
covering the events of the Rose Revolution, Rustavi 2 was one of the elements that 
actively participated in the power play and sustained the illusion of unit y of the Georgian 
national identity. In Georgia that experienced civil war and two ethnie conflicts in the 
first years of its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, unit y was something 
that simply did not exist. The Rose Revolution painted a picture of the promise of unit y 
through the lens of media coverage and political discourse. The Rose Revolution in a 
sense became the symbol of unit Y for Georgian people in the 21 st century, but this unit y 
was constructed through the exclusion of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as aIl the 
citizens of Georgia who did not support or take part in the Rose Revolution. In fact, the' 
only discourse on unit y that arose was in the context of support for the opposition forces 
and the fact that unit y among the opposition leaders themselves was fractured went 
completely ignored. Burjanadze, Zvania and Saakashvili had different opinions on the 
future of Georgia, but only the opinion of Saakashvili was emphasized by Rustavi 2. 
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In the tale of unit y projected by Rustavi 2 any possible detail was used to reinforce the 
vision ofunity. For instance the fact that police did not prevent opposition forces from 
entering the parliament was invoked to create a sense of unit y for the Georgian people, 
when the reporter pointed out that a Georgian wouldn't affront a fellow Georgian. In 
other words, only similarities were put in the spotlight, but differences such as political 
orientation were overlooked, neutralized with Georgian-ness, shared by both 
demonstrators and police. 
Most importantly by playing an important role in the Rose Revolution Rustavi 2 became 
a self referential actor nearly overshadowing the opposition forces in the struggle against 
Shevardnadze and his government. Rustavi 2 portrayed themselves as a crucial force 
against Shevardnadze and after the opposition forces stormed the parliament, Rustavi 2 
announced that Shevardnadze had issued an order to shut down the channel. Opposition 
leaders and among them Saakashvili came to the defense of the channel addressing 
people to defend Rustavi 2: 
We have won! The whole world is with us. If Rustavi 2 is shut down, this is the sign 
that Shevardnadze will try to tise force against us. Don't let them do it, don't let 
them shut down Rustavi 2. That man [Shevardnadze] has to be removed peacefully 
(Kurieri Post Scriptum, November 22nd 2003). 
As the anchor noted after Saakashvili's statement, Rustavi 2 was protected by its viewers 
- citizens of Georgia who had gathered outside the Rustavi 2 office. The camera pans to 
the crowd outside as they hold burning torches and write the letters "SOS" in fire. This 
"SOS" was a very we1I prepared media spectacle that drew a large reaction from the 
people. As strange as it seems, a viewer could actually see a person giving orders to the 
crowd on how to hold their torches so that people watching at home could see the sign 
"SOS.~' With this. coverage, Rustavi 2 became the ultimate hero of the Rose Revolution: 
the sole channel that was telIing the truth and that had threatened Shevardnadze so much 
that he personally issued an order to shut them down. It was never confirmed whether or 
not Shevardnadze had indeed issued an order to shut down Rustavi 2. After this incident, 
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the focus was displaced from politics to the media as a leading force behind the peaceful 
revolution. 
In an article published in a weekly newspaper Kviris Palitra entitled "Why was Rustavi 2 
blamed", it is clearly outlined how Rustavi 2 became the leading actor in the Rose 
Revolution and why was it attacked by the govemment to a greater extent than opposition 
forces (Jikashvili, November 17-23,2003: A4). During the Rose Revolution 
Shevardnadze and certain pro-govemment politicians boycotted the channel. In the same 
article a producer of the evening news Kurieri, Eka Khoperia, noted: "The govemment 
blamed Rustavi 2 for the massive demonstrations and they thought that by confronting us, 
demonstrations would stop. But in fact by attacking us they attacked ordinary people" 
(Jikashvili, November 17-23,2003: A4). 
Khoperia not only gives credit to Rustavi 2 for the demonstrations, but also declares that 
Rustavi 2 and Georgian people were fighting for the same goals. In other words, she 
suggests that Georgian people were allied with Rustavi 2, with the latter being more 
instrumental than the former in the unfolding of the events. Throughout the coverage of 
the Rose evolution, joumalists of Rustavi 2 portrayed themselves as fighters for justice 
and truth. By showing the resistance of joumalists against pressure from govemment 
officiais and their supporters, they were depicted as martyrs. As an interviewee RIO 
recalled, viewers felt obliged by the joumalists of Rustavi 2 to go outside and 
demonstrate against Shevardnadze, as joumalists had sacrificed so much for the people 
and it was now time for the people to pay back the favor. 
By documenting every aspect of the Rose Revolution, Rustavi 2 coverage started to 
generate an extremely weil organized media spectacle with constant camera presence. 
This might be explained by the fact that "the professional ideology of news is geared 
toward an ideal collapse of temporal and spatial difference" (Hemmingway, 2004: 411). 
When this collapse occurs as it did on November 22 _23rd 2003, the credibility of the 
news becomes questionable as it leaves the impression of a media spectacle as there is no 
space or time between the real event and the media event (Hemmingway, 2004). During 
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events similar to the Rose Revolution, where the media are omnipresent, the difference 
between reality and the news (which 1 must stress is a product of the media) becomes 
blurred, causing the spectacle effect to threaten the credibility of the news 
(Hemmingway, 2004). 
The only moment when the Rustavi 2 was unable to anticipate events and the crisis was 
actually feU by the viewers was during the translation of the statement ofresignation 
made by Shevardnadze. As journalists of Rustavi 2 were boycotted by Shevardnadze 
because of their open support for the opposition forces, Rustavi 2 was not allowed to film 
the statement. As a result, Shevardnadze's statement of resignation was broadcasted 
through a cell phone. Because ofthis the sound quality was poor contributing to the 
confusion as both reporter and anchor seemed genuinely lost not knowing what to say. 
Rustavi 2 ended their extensive coverage of the Rose Revolution by announcing: 
Today November 23rd, St. George's day, at 9 p.m., Eduard Shevardnadze resigned. 
He has declared that he is not planning to leave Georgia. The president has 
maintained his and Georgia's dignity by his decision to resign (Rustavi 2, 
November 23rd 2003). 
Throughout the Rose Revolution, Rustavi 2 represented an important force in the struggle 
against Shevardnadze and his government. Not only did Rustavi 2 openly support the 
opposition forces but it also actively urged Georgians to participate in the Rose 
Revolution as the new prosperous beginning marked by unit y among Georgian people. 
However, to achieve this vision of unit y Rustavi 2 silenced ethnie question and difference 
present with Georgian society both on cultural and politicallevels. 
3.3. Conclusion 
After the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia like many post-Soviet and Eastern European 
countries needed to create new national identity that could consequently be interiorized 
by the people, as this would aid in fulfilling the illusion of unit y within Georgia and 
between Georgians. Differences blatantly present in Georgia - such as its multiethnic 
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population - were silenced. Meanwhile elements that contributed to the vision of unit y -
such as the Georgian culture, the Georgian ethnic group, and the selective mobilization 
and interpretation of history - were brought to the forefront to create a natural vision of a 
unified national identity. 
Throughout the coverage of the Rose Revolution, the main debate on national identity 
was in its transition from the "old" to the "new" Georgia and unit y of Georgian people. 
To accentuate this discursive unit y, the media approached national identity through 
Christianity and the unique Georgian culture that were brought up as universal unifying 
factors. Therefore the symbols incorporated in describing the unit y of Georgian people 
and boundary-making were both cultural and religious, su ch as St. George and Geoq?;ian 
folk music that accompanied the Rose Revolution from beginning to end. The unit y of 
Georgian people was mobilized to emphasize the beginning of the new era dismissing ail 
negative factors that had emerged during the first years of independence, such as extreme 
poverty and the two ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Discourse on the transition from "old" to "new" Georgia incorporated the introduction of 
the new Rose Revolution inspired national symbols that detached Georgian national 
identity from the "old" Georgia that was associated with corruption and ethnic conflicts. 
The new national symbols also marked the change in the political orientation of Georgia 
from Shevardnadze's post Soviet dependence on Russia to Saakashvili's European 
aspirations. In a sense, the Rose Revolution was a national cultural renewal as a prote st 
against [the] post-Communist heritage represented by Shevardnadze, but also 
demonstration of Georgia's European aspirations. Overall, the Rose Revolution was 
shaped to end the Soviet legacy attached to Georgia. 
Another discourse that was central to shaping the Georgian national identity during the 
Rose Revolution was that of unit y within the Georgian national identity. As many authors 
argue, the vision of unit y is crucial in maintaining a national identity. In Georgia's case, 
the vision of unit y was flagged through Christianity and Georgian culture, viewed by 
many as integral parts of the Georgian national identity. Christianity was mo bilized to. 
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perform the boundary making by including Christian Orthodox Georgians and excluding 
others mai ni y representatives of ethnic minorities that practice different religions. By 
invoking Christianity as a unifying factor, topics conceming ethnic minorities were 
silenced and largely unquestioned as it threatened the fragile unit y flagged in the media. 
This might explain why in such a multi-ethnic country as Georgia, ethnic minorities were 
largely excluded from the media coverage ofthe Rose Revolution. 
Georgian culture was mobilized in the discourse on unit y in order to reinforce Georgian 
national identity by differentiating it from others and establishing it as unique. Georgian 
culture and folklore was evoked numerous times throughout the eveqts, stressing the 
unique Georgian style of revolting in their fight for justice. At the same time discourse on 
the uniqueness of Georgian culture contributed towards establishing symbolic boundaries 
by including Georgians that relate to it and excluding others that are not entitled to 
understand it. 
A discourse on the political narrative of Georgia was also omnipresent during the Rose 
Revolution, but at the same time was very selective in its recollection of events. "Bad 
times," suchas civil war and ethnic conflicts, were invoked to de scribe the "old" Georgia 
associated with Shevardnadze; while "good times" were invoked to de scribe the "new" 
Georgia, a rebirth of the good times. Political history is characterized by the strategic 
forgetting and remembering. As Bhabha (1990) argues, the strategic remembering of 
certain elements and forgetting of others constitutes the beginning ofthe nation's 
narrative. 
While talking about dominant discourses disseminated in the media during the Rose 
Revolution it is important to situate Rustavi 2 in the hegemonic moment of the nation 
construction. Rustavi 2 played an important rolein establishing the Rose Revolution as 
an historic moment for the Georgian nation, a point of change and transformation. By 
according historic values to these events and presenting them as natural and 
unquestionable Rustavi 2 contributed to fixing common sense meanings around the Rose 
Revolution. Furthermore, by compromising objec~ivity and openly taking the side of the 
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opposition Rustavi 2 shaped itself as the ultimate hero of the Rose Revolution. As a result 
Rustavi 2 emerged as a self-referential force in the Rose Revolution, by displacing the 
focus from politics to media and situating itself as the leading instrumental force behind 
the Rose Revolution crediting itselfwith the successful resolution of the events. 
Finally, Georgian national identity rearticulated through the Rose Revolution did not 
introduce new radical elements that would threaten the integrity of the Georgian national 
identity flagged before. Rather, elements flagged during the Rose Revolution - su ch as 
the unit y of the Georgian nation, the restoration of territorial integrity, and new political 
orientation - reinforced the essential vision of Georgian identity, as these were discursive 
elements that had always been present and were always at stake for those who considered 
themselves Georgian. 
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4. Semi-structured interviews 
This chapter explores how three years after the Rose Revolution ordinary Georgians have 
either negotiated and interiorised, or contrarily rejected the Georgian national identity 
flagged by the media and political discourse during November 2003. Of particular 
interest is how people conceive oftheir Georgian national identity: how they have created 
categories of exclusion and inclusion and how these differ from those disseminated 
through the media during the Rose Revolution. In order to address the questions 
mentioned above it has been important to discuss the role of Rustavi 2 and see how it has 
been redefined in the three years from the Rose Revolution. 
Eleven semi-structured interviews conducted with both ethnic Georgians and 
representatives of ethnic minorities in Georgia (See annex 1 for the list of respondents), 
have provided more insight into the nature of the post-Rose Revolution Georgian national 
identity - particularly with regard to the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of ethnic 
minorities within media coverage ofthese events and everyday practices. In contrast with 
critical discourse analysis of the media archive, these interviews provided access to the 
personal experiences of the respondents and highlighted different opinions. This part of 
the research has enabled me to pursue my interest in personal perceptions of the Georgian 
national identity, particularly in relation to the events of the Rose Revolution. 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the respondents' perception of the Rose 
Revolution and a discussion of the specific role of Rustavi 2. Three years after the events 
of 2003, retrospective commentary facilitates reflections on the Rose Revolution. The 
second and third parts of this chapter are dedicated to a discussion of Georgian national 
identity and the subjects' interpretations of what it is to be "Georgian." Concentration 
was placed on the participants' perceptions of "Georgian-ness" and how this may have. 
been reformulated after the Rose Revolution. 
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4.1. Rustavi 2 at the heart of the Rose Revolution 
This section analyses the respondents' interpretations of the Rose Revolution, their 
perceptions of the role played by Rustavi 2, and how these perceptions have changed in 
the three years after the Rose Revolution. 
Ail eleven respondents closely foilowed the events of the Rose Revolution exclusively on 
Rustavi 2, while seven ofthem of different origins (RI, R3, R4, R5, R6, R9, R 10 see 
annex 1) also participated in the demonstrations held on the Rustaveli A venue. 
RI: 1 started regularly attending demonstrations on Rustaveli Avenue starting 
from November 21 st. 1 participated because 1 really wanted the old government to 
leave. Unlike others, 1 did not stay there for ten hours a day because 1 had to work, 
but don't get me wrong 1 respect people who did stay there: they believed in the 
Rose Revolution as did 1 at that moment. 1 was there waving flags inspired by 
highly patriotic ideas. 1 thought 1 was part of something extremely important and 
that Georgia would be saved. Of course now 1 understand that it was ail thanks to 
the Rustavi 2 propaganda. 
Rustavi 2's aggressive style ofreporting and their portrayal of the Rose Revolution 
influenced not only the recorded history of the events but also narratives of the 
interviewees. While ail of the interviewed respondents agreed upon the crucial role 
Rustavi 2 played in the successful development and peaceful culmination of the Rose 
Revolution, their visions of Rustavi 2 differed. 
4.1.1. Rustavi 2: hero or villain? 
Although interviews were conducted individually, because of the explicit patterns 
concerning difference of opinions and consensus on the role of Rustavi 2 within the Rosé 
Revolution 1 have separated interviewees into three groups according to their 
perspectives. The first one was ethnically mixed, the second composed of only ethnic 
Georgians and the third one composed of ethnic minorities. In the first group 1 have 
inc1uded two journalists (RI, R4) and one graduate student in the media studies (RIO). 
The group was critical towards Rustavi 2 but at the same time recognized the key role of 
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the channel and praised their quality ofreporting. In the second group composed of 
ethnic Georgians l have included respondents of the older generation, R2 linguist, R3 
university professor, R5 history teacher and R6 university professor. This group was the 
most critical towards Rustavi 2 and expressed·views about staged character ofthe Rose 
Revolution and manipulation of people by Rustavi 2 .. Finally, the third group, composed 
of representatives of ethnic minorities (R 8, R9 and R Il) praised Rustavi 2 for their 
participation in the events of the Rose Revolution and dismissed criticisms of objectivity 
and the agitated style of reporting. 
Group 1 
R4: Everyone knew the position of Rustavi 2, they did not recognize neutrality 
but their coverage was great. Rustavi 2 was like a Georgian version of CNl'l", with 
their breaking news and 24 hour coverage. Other channels completely faded in 
comparison. For example the 1 st channel was inadequate during the Rose 
Revolution when majority of Tbilisi residents were outside demonstrating they 
were reporting that absolutely nothing was happening, it was just ridiculous as 
always! 
For respondent R4, a last year student in Journalism, Rustavi 2 represented the ideal of 
Western reporting that was the antithesis ofSovietjournalism that dominated Georgian 
media even after independence. Even the fact that Rustavi 2 compromised the objectivity 
of their reporting did not seem to decrease their popularity and professionalism in the 
eyes of this respondent. With their 24-hour coverage and joumalists that braved corrupt 
.officials Rustavi 2 quickly became the most watched TV channel in Georgia. 
In fact Rustavi 2 was the first channel in poverty-stricken Georgia to introduce 
investigative journalism mainly oriented towards critique ofthe lavish lifestyles of 
corrupt government officiaIs and the family members of Shevardnadze. As a result 
evening news Kurieri Post Scriptum became an instant hit with viewers by voicing the 
people's deception and anger. Kurieri had become notorious for heated debates in which 
government officiaIs were openly accused of corruption on a daily basis. 
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RI: ln the last five years since Kurieri was put on the air, 1 remember every single 
news edition being dedicated to demonstrating how corrupt and useless the old 
regime was. 1 have never seen anything positive. Frankly, 1 don't know if 
journalists did it themselves or ifthey were ordered by somebody, but anyways, 
ail this anti-government propaganda was very weil done, especially when nobody 
really questioned the credibility of Rustavi 2 as people liked what they saw and 
heard. 
As the popularity of the channel was skyrocketing, Shevardnadze's government did not 
abide by Rustavi 2's critique quietly: the government launched a series ofultimately 
unsuccessful efforts to close down Rustavi 2. One of the most unsuccessful and infamous 
efforts brought up by the interviewees occurred in October 2001, when the National 
Security Ministry raided Rustavi 2's headquarters fifteen minutes prior to the evening 
news, claiming that the y were searching for financial records. Since the search coincided 
with the evening news, journalists broadcasted the entire raid live, urging viewers to 
come to the Rustavi 2 headquarters and defend the journalists who were facing pressure 
from the government. This caU to action worked, as thousands of people came to the 
Rustavi 2 headquarters demanding the resignation of President Shevardnadze, who se 
actions appeared to be threatening the liberty of media in Georgia. An intervention that 
had initially been planned to repress Rustavi 2 instead skyrocketed the station's 
popularity. 
RIO: Rustavi 2 was always reporting exclusively negative information. This had a 
psychological effect on people as it made them angrier and more aggressive in 
wanting change. 1 remember when Rustavi 2 was raided: journalists were urging 
people to come outside and support them. It wasaU happening late at night and at 
that time people were afraid to go outside at night - there was no light, no police, 
nothing. But people did come to support the joumalists! 
The only thing that still bothers me is why the raid happened just before evening 
news?! 1 remember we hadjournalists of other channels visiting our faculty and 
the y said the same thing, about the raid coinciding with the beginning of the 
evening news. Over aU Rustavi 2 was doing everything to fight the government 
, and any means were good in that struggle. People adored Rustavi 2 and watched it 
religiously. 1 guess Shevardnadze just did not believe or realize that Rustavi 2 had 
such power and could mobilize so many people in no time. 
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Respondents RIO and RI, both working in the media, believe the demonstrations and 
crises triggered by the National Security Ministry raid of Rustavi ~ was nothing more 
than a'rehearsal for the Rose Revolution two years later. 
RI: This incident was very weIl used by Rustavi 2. l think it was not about 
freedom of speech at aIl, on the contrary it was like testing people's reaction-
would they come outside to defend them - and people did. So they pretty much 
used the same tactics during the Rose Revolution. AIso, they introduced Misha 
[Saakashvili] as a person who cared about the rights of people and rehabilitated 
the image of Zurab Zvania whom nobody liked anymore; but after he resigned as 
Speaker of Parliament, the attitude towards him changed. 
As respondent RI who is a press journalist working for one of the popular newspapers in 
Tbilisi note d, this incident also put Saakashvili on the political map. However, it was the 
Rose Revolution that genuinely made him popular. As Minister of Justice at that time, 
Saakashvili resigned to prote st the government's actions against the media, an act 
followed by the Speaker of Parliament Zvania. Both Saakashvili and Zvania formed their 
own opposition parties: the National Movement and the United Democrats respectively. 
Another incident that RI mentioned was the assassination of Giorgi Sanaya, a popular 
anchor of Rustavi 2's Kurieri. This incident in her opinion reinforced Rustavi 2's status 
and triggered popular protests against the government. With both joumalists and the 
greater public agreeing that he had been murdered because of his work, people once 
again came to the station's headquarters to show support for Rustavi 2 and to demonstrate 
against the government who had been blamed. Shevardnadze and his government were 
portrayed as the villains in their several attempts at closing down Rustavi 2, pressuring 
and ev en murdering reporters who were only informing on government corruption and 
ineffectiveness. 
However, it was mainly during the Rose Revolution when the Rustavi 2's struggle 
against Shevardnadze and his government reached its climax. 
RI: Propaganda against the old regime was getting stronger and more elaborate. l 
remember when Kurieri aired this story entitled "Toilet Govemment" in which 
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they ftashed images of government officiaIs that people hated and it had huge 
success and was actually funny. AlI these humoristic shows were mocking 
everybody except Saakashvili, Burjanadze and Zvania. AlI this propaganda really 
did work but 1 realized it only recently, because when 1 first watched it 1 believe'd 
it was true and genuine. Now 1 don't think this way anymore. 
Respondents RI, R4 and RIO agreed that they did not question the validity of the 
station's statements in 2003, although three years after the Rose Revolution they see 
Rustavi 2 in different light - as the machine of propaganda and manipulation that helped 
to stage the Rose Revolution. For instance, RI who is a press joumaiist emphàsized 
Rustavi 2's use ofvisual manipulation, stating that the number of demonstrators was 
exaggerated and that the cameramen had used special tricks to make the demonstrations 
seem larger and more impressive than it was in reality. 
RI: 1 guess many people indeed participated in the demonstrations, but what 
Rustavi 2 reported was blown out of the proportion. For example they would 
report that hundred of thousands of people were gathered on Rustaveli A venue, 
but 1 really doubt that so many people .came outside. They al ways showed images 
of demonstrators tightly packed together, so you never knew for sure if the 
demonstrators were as numerous as stated, or ifthey were simply crowded in a 
relatively small space. 1 guess it was Rustavi 2's way ofpresenting their 
information in a special way to make it more important, memorable. Just like they 
projected that Georgian people made Shevardnadze resign, but in reality 
everything was planned from the beginning. It was sorne sort of a deal 1 guess. 
Look at Shevardnadze he is still safe in his residency. 
While mentioning Rustavi 2' s visual manipulation, these respondents also emphasized 
the channel's role in the transformation of the little-known Saakashvili into a national 
hero and the symbol of the Rose Revolution. During Rose Revolution coverage, Rustavi 
2 portrayed Saakashvili as a leader destined to continue the tradition of King David IV, in 
rebuilding poverty-stricken Georgia into a prosperous European-style country. After 
winning the 2004 presidential elections, Saakashvili consolidated his public image by 
choosing the symbolic location of the tomb of King David IV to deliver his inaugural 
speech. AlI this happened after the Rose Revolution, but previously Saakashvili had been 
largely unknown. Educated as a lawyer in the United States, he went on to become the 
Minister of Justice in the Shevardnadze government; however he resigned after one year 
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in protest of the October 2001 raid of Rustavi 2 by the Ministry of National Security. 
Soon after his resignation, Saakashvili formed his own opposition party, the National 
Movement, which became known to the larger public only.in 2003 when it was elected to 
the Tbilisi city council. 
RIO: Nobody had heard of Saakashvili before the Rose Revolution. Nobody took 
him seriously. 1 remember people were calling him "Karlsson"ll because he was 
al ways talking about fixing roofs, painting houses and making over-the-top 
speeches. But this changed during the Rose Revolution when cameras followed 
Misha [Mikheil Saakashvili] everywhere. We always saw him kissing and 
hugging people. 1 guess they created him in the image of a man of the people. It 
really irritated me because it seemed fake. He is really smart man and he used 
everybody, among them Rustavi 2. 
RI: 1 used to be fascinated by Misha. Each time 1 saw him on TV 1 was excited. 
We constantly saw his interviews on CNN and BBC, he spoke fluent English and 
French, and he was so emotional and seemed genuinely committed to what he was 
doing. Now 1 understand that 1 hadjust been affected by the non-stop Rustavi 2 
propaganda. 
During the Rose Revolution Saakashvili indeed became the most popular and most 
interviewed politician in Georgia with Rustavi 2 documenting his every step. He was 
presented in the media as a populist leader who embraced people, was close to them and 
listened to their problems; this image operated in contrast to Shevardnadze, who had 
continued in the trend of the Soviet era, distancing himself from people and rulingthe 
country from his office. In fact, as interviewee RI mentioned, Saakashvili was the total 
antithesis to Shevardnadze: he was young, charismatic and spoke severallanguages. He 
was very different from Shevardnadze, who after serving many years as the USSR's 
Foreign Affairs Minister was still unable to leam proper Russian. 
Il Karlsson is s fictional character who J ives on the roof in the house in Stockholm in a series of Children' s 
books entitled "Karlsson on the roof' written by Swedish writer Astrid Lindgren. 
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Group 2 
Respondents included in the second group were the most critical towards Rustavi 2 and 
blamed the channel for staging the Rose Revolution. The staged character of the Rose 
Revolution was invoked during interviews more that once, al ways implying the decisive 
role of Rustavi 2 in making the Rose Revolution seem natural and spontaneous. 
R6: When revolution happens, the media al ways play a crucial role. In Georgia 
everything was exaggerated. The way Rustavi 2 covered the events seemed 
grotesque. \lfany moments were purely staged and it is weird that people can stage 
Revolution at aIl! 
Moments that were most often referred to as staged by R6, who is university professor in 
political science, were the seizure of parliament by Saakashvili and the convoy of cars 
that was framed by the media and opposition leaders as the culmination of the unity of 
Georgian people. One of the reasons why these two key moments that defined the Rose 
Revolution left the impression of being "fake" according to R6 was the agitated style of 
reportingand absence of objectivity in Rustavi 2 coverage. 
R6: l don't think Saakashvili seized parliament at aIl. AIl he did in reality he just 
defeated an old man. The government was in deep crisis. yet in his absurd speech 
Shevardnadze was talkingabout Dutch cows. Can you really credit defeating him 
as a heroic act?! That's why it felt fake to me. 
The other much-discussed key moment of the Rose Revolution invoked in the interviews 
as fake was the convoy of cars entering Tbilisi. On November 21 st 2003 thousands of 
opposition-supporters came to Tbilisi and were greeted by residents as heroes, this 
mOment being framed by Rustavi 2 as the culmination of unit y of thé Georgian people. 
Despite such a portrayal, interviewees included in the second group saw the convoy of 
cars as a media spectacle orchestrated by Rustavi 2 in order to demonstrate that Georgia 
was united against President Shevardnadze. One respondent noted: 
R2: The majority of people that came to Tbilisi that day did not come on their 
own, the y were brought here by Saaklashvili who went to the regions and brought 
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everybody he could find by promising that when he came to power all the 
problems \yould be solved. 
ln an interview featured in the documentary entitled "People make the revolution" made 
in 2004 on the first anniversary of the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili did not deny that. 
people indeed were brought from Georgian regions to Tbilisi by his initiative. He even 
recalled a tale of heroism, when people from a town in western Georgia refused to take 
money for the petrol and instead decided to pay for it themselves, despite the fact that the 
majority of these citizens lived on the brink of poverty. 
Despite criticism, respondent R3, also University professor, mentioned that the convoy of 
cars, or the "convoy of unit y" as Rustavi 2 called it, was a determining moment during 
the Course of the Rose Revolution. The footage, showing thousands of cars entering a 
darkened Tbilisi (alI street lights were off due to an electricity shortage), was a 
motivating factor to go outside and support the opposition forces. 
R3: It was very emotional to see aIl these people coming to Tbilisi. 1 remember a 
reporter standing among the people, greeting the convoy, and he was calling for 
the people [watching] at home to come outside and be a part of this all, and it 
worked on me, 1 went on the demonstration that day. 
But as R3 noted, the thing that shattered the illusion oft~e Rose Revolution's 
authenticity, the unit y rendered by the media, and the portrayed overwhelming support 
for opposition forces was the Serbian documentary entitled "Bringing down the dictator." 
The events recorded in the film occurred in Serbia during 2000, when President Slobodan 
Milosevic was overthrown. Interestingly, this documentary features footage very similar 
to the Rose Revolution' s "convoy of unit y": portrayed in the film was a convoy of cars 
and buses that carried opposition supporters to Belgrade. Rustavi 2 broadcast this 
documentary twice before the Rose Revolution and shortly after. 
R3: When 1 saw it [Bringing Down the Dictator] 1 felt really bad. If! had seen the 
documentary beforehand 1 would not have gone to the demonstrations. 1 used to 
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compare the Rose Revolution to the events of the 9th of April 1989,12 a time when 
Georgians were reaIly united. After l saw the Serbian documentary, l understood 
that it was just a very weIl-orchestrated event: we were copying Serbia, doing the 
same thing just with the different name. In fact, Rustavi 2 created the revolutio~ -
they manipulated us and made us do what they wanted us to do! 
Significantly, R5 who is a history teacher, recognized that Rustavi 2's portrayal of the 
Rose Revolution was exaggerated and sometimes manipulative; in fact, he thinks that 
without Rustavi 2 the Rose Revolution might have never materialized. 
R5: l am sure aIl that happened would have ended without any results if Rustavi 2 
had not supported opposition forces. With their 24-hour coverage they became the 
voice behind the Rose Revolution. They exaggerated everything and escalated the. 
situation, but it was impossible to live like that anymore and it made 
Shevardnadze's resignation inevitable. At that time l supported it as l thought they 
were doing good things. l still think that way. 
Group 3 
Three respondents, R8, R9 and Rll (the first two being of Azeri origin and the third 
Ukrainian) were the only interviewees who claimed that everything they saw on Rustavi 
2 was true and no manipulation had even taken place. 
R8: Everything Rustavi 2 showed was true, it was aIl filmed and cameras don't 
lie. They showed everything we saw with our own eyes when we went outside. 
Today l hear very often that Rustavi 2 urged people to come outside and 
demonstrate against Shevardnadze and yes they did it but this doesn't mean that 
they manipulated us. 
Ultimately, aU of the interviewees acknowledged Rustavi 2's important place in the 
development of the Rose Revolution. Respondents with a background in the media 
praised Rustavi 2's professionalism while covering the events but still mentioned that the 
coverage was sometimes exaggerated. They also noted Rustavi 2' s active propaganda 
against Shevardnadze as the key element in bringing people outside to demonstrate. 
12 On 9th April 1989, students participating in a peaceful demonstration against the Soviet Govemment 
were attacked by the Soviet Army, resulting in deaths of several people. This incident generated strong 
resistance and massive hatred towards the Soviet Govemment which was 'expressed though weeks of 
demonstrations. 9th April 1989 marked an important moment for Georgian liberation movement. 
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Meanwhile, respondents inc1uded in the second group emphasized "fake" character of the 
Rose Revolution and Rustavi 2's manipulation of people. Finally, respondents in the third 
group praised Rustavi 2 for their truthful reporting. 
The pattern of interview finding in this segment was mostly influenced by the occupation 
of the respondents. Respondents in the first group had media background, two ofthem 
being journalists and one graduate student in the media studies. Responderits in the 
second group were aIl in education, three ofthem being university professors and one 
school teacher. Aiso significant was the age group (respondents inc1uded in the first 
group were younger that 40 years old and respondents in the second group were aIl older 
than 40), and ethnic background (as respondents inc1uded in the third group were of 
Azeri and Ukrainian origin). 
Both media analysis and interviews indicate the planned character of the Rose 
Revolution. Interview findings being more critical as three years from these events the 
majority of the interviewees recognize that the Rose Revolution was not as spontaneous 
as flagged in the media. 
4.2. The "New" Georgia 
During and especially after the Rose Revolution the main debate on Georgian national 
identity both within and outside media contexts was the transition to "new" Georgia. 
This section will focus on how interviewees have negotiated the emergence of a "new" 
Georgia characterized by European integration, new national symbols, national pride and 
unity. The narratives of the informants highlight how they have perceived changes in 
Georgia after the Rose Revolution and how the se changes were manifested in everyday 
life. 
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4.2.1. European Integration 
In media and political discourse, European integration was emphasized as a shift away' 
from a war-torn and poverty-stricken post-Soviet Georgia, towards a prosperous 
European-style state with democratic values. As Jones writes, "the Rose Revolution 
embodies a long and idealistic tradition among Georgian intelligentsia since the mid-
1800s to replace the legacies of colonialism and authoritarianism with Europeanism" 
(Jones, 2005: 37). Indeed the first attempt to construct a Georgian national identity and to 
generate the mo bilization of Georgians was undertaken at the end of the 19th century by a 
group of Georgian intelligentsia kriown as Tergdalelulni. This group had been formed as 
a response to the domination and repressions of the Russian Empire that Georgia was part 
of. Educated in Europe, Tergdaleulni reinforced cultural and political unions with 
Europe between 1918 and 1923, when the Georgian republic was established. During the 
Rose Revolution, the pro-European aspirations oftheir predecessors were once again 
introduced into Georgian dialogue and discourse. However, the attitude of aIl eleven 
respondents towards Georgia as a part of Europe was rather pessimistic and negative. AU 
interviewees, differences of ethnic origins and of age, see European. integration as an 
attempt to assJmilate Georgians into European culture, which is felt to be very different 
from their own. 
RI: We can talk about European integration as much as we want but our mentality 
has not changed with the Rose Revolution and honestly it is far from being 
European. For example 1 can't even relate to European movies so how can 1 
become European?! 
The majority of respondents view European integration as unrealistic. According to them, 
Georgian culture does not bear many similarities with European culture, which is 
perceived to be largely pragmatic and lacking in the family values that are crucial to the 
Georgian way of life. As explained by respondent R3, one could become European, 
though would be forced to compromise many features that make them definitively 
Georgian. 
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R3: They want us to be integrated into Europe but our mentality will change if we 
stop communicating with our families and became exactly like them. Georgia is 
interesting because of our culture and people that are very different from 
Europeans. If we denounce our roots we williose everything we have, we will 
lose our identity. We bear values that modem Europeans lost a long time ago. In a 
way we are the lost memory of Europe. 
According to R3, being European and being Georgian are two different things that have 
little in common. A statement pronounced by deceased Georgian Prime Minister Zurab 
Zvania at the Council of Europe in Strasburg, in which he asserted "1 am Georgian 
therefore 1 am European," defines the orientation of post-Rose Revolution Georgia, . 
despite its failed acceptance by the interviewees. 
R2: 1 don't think it is such an honour for Georgians to be considered as 
Europeans. 1 prefer our country to be unique, different with its traditions. We have 
to be who we are and not try to be like Europeans. Why do we have to be like 
them; why can't they be like us?! 1 don't want to be European; 1 prefer and want 
to be Georgian. How can 1 be happy about the fact that 1 am Georgian when at the 
same time 1 ap1 trying to be European?! It is just unacceptable for me. 
For a country that was detached and isolated from Europe for more than 75 years under 
the regime of the Soviet Union, reintegration into Europe appears rather complicated. 
Especially when being European is perceived as a threat that will eliminate Georgian 
culture and subsequently take its place. Because of this, European integration is se en by 
the interviewe es as a betrayal of Georgian-ness and something that is not occurring 
naturally but rather being forced. 
R7: They try to change who we are in order to make us look more European. For 
instance after the Rose Revolution they started teaching in the schools that when 
you are on a bus you should never cede your place to anybody because you have 
paid for it. But how about respect for older people, we should stop respecting 
them just because we paid for the bus ride?! It is just stupid and why do we have 
, to renounce our traditions and live by the rules that are acceptable in Europe?! 
This is just very bad. 
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The very same example about a bus was invoked by two other respondents R5 and R2 
that see European integration as a purely cultural process that will eradicate Georgian 
traditions and lifestyle. Therefore European integration, presented by the new 
government as a longtime tradition interrupted by Communism, seems unflattering for aIl 
the interviewees of different age and ethnic origin. For them European integration 
threatens Georgian culture itself as becoming European places Georgian culture in an 
inferior position. It is interesting to note that the issue of European integration was the 
only exception where aIl eleven respondents regardless their ethnicorigin, age or 
occupation expressed similar ideas. 
European integration that is shaped in the political discourse as a carrier of modernity and 
progress is denounced by the interviewees as it represents a serious threat to Georgian 
national identity. For the respondents European-ness is the opposite of Georgian-ness and 
two simply can not coexist. 
4.2.2. National Symbols 
One of the major changes after the Rose Revolution was the introduction of new national 
symbols: the new flag, the national anthem and the coat of arms. These symbols were to 
mark the beginning of a new era for Georgia. The new symbols were introduced to 
replace old ones, which were associated with the negative recent past of independent 
Georgia: one example was the ethnic conflicts and the bad image of Georgia abroad. 
After the election of Saakashvili the new five-cross flag that had first emerged as the flag 
of "National Movement" party was to be transformed into the new flag of Georgia. 
R9: As for as l know, l have heard it on TV the new flag is actuaIly the old flag. 
As l remember King David IV won sorne major battle with this flag and our 
, president won again under the same flag. 
The association of the new five-cross flag with King David IV and the Golden Age of 
Georgian invoked by R9, who is history teacher of Azeri origin, is rather symbolic. The 
Golden Age is currently most often invoked both in media and political discourse as an 
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example of how a shattered Georgia can be reunited, as King David IV "the Builder" 
reunited the Georgian kingdom in the XII century. For example, after his election in 
February 2004 Saakashvili chose to deliver his inaugural speech on ~he grave of the King 
David IV as a sign that he will repeat King David's glorious path. 
However, respondent RI, who is a journalist of Georgian origin, explains that it is not the 
association with the Golden Age that makes the new symbols special but what they 
represent today. 
RI: 1 did not like the old flag, it was lame. This one is better, it has crosses. The 
old flag was the symbol of a po or and devastated Georgia. When refugees fled 
Abkhazia this was the flag they carried, and for me it was always the symbol of 
defeat and war; in contrast, the new flag is the symbol of a strong country and the 
Rose Revolution. It unifies al! of us who stood on Rustaveli Avenue as we can 
relate to what happened and how things have changed in Georgia. 1 also like the 
new national anthem, each time 1 hear it 1 feel patriotic. 1 know it is banal but 1 
really love Georgia. 
For respondent R7 who is of Armenian origin, new national symbols correspond to the 
situation that Georgia is now facing. He emphasizes that the new flag is also better 
known outside Georgia as it had been flagged by international media such as CNN and 
BBC during the Rose Revolution. In contrast the old flag of Georgia was completely 
unknown to the rest of the worId, those being familiar with it associating it with negative 
events that occurred in Georgia such as the ethnic conflicts and civil war during the early 
1990s. 
R7: The new national symbols are more progressive, more 21 st century-style. 1 
really like it. The new flag is Christian and this is important for me. For example, 
if 1 go to the US and say that 1 am citizen of Georgia they will respect me because 
this flag is the symbol of what happened here during the Rose Revolution. 1 did 
not like the flag of Gamsakhurdia [the old flag] as 1 did not like him for saying 
that Georgia was for Georgians. For instance 1 am Arnlenian but Georgia is my 
country! When you hold the new flag you are not ashamed, as nothing shameful 
was done under this flag, differently from the old one. 
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Sorne of the respondents mainly from the younger generation and representatives of 
ethnie minorities embrace the new national symbols; in contrast, others, mainly ethnie 
Georgians of the oIder generation, still believe that the change was unneeessary as the old 
national symbols represented the struggle of Georgia against Soviet domination and the 
consequent restoration of independence in 1991. 
R2: 1 liked the old flag. It had spiritual meaning for me, it was a flag of the 
liberation movement and the first republic of Georgia. PersonaIly, 1 also preferred 
the old flag as it was more original and beautiful. In contrast, this flag is 
somewhat plain and people also say that this is a catholic flag not Orthodox but 1 
haven't really researched it to claim thatit is true. 
According to R6, the change of national symbols has been disrespectful to aIl Georgians 
who fought for the independence of Georgia. As he argues, the changing of national 
symbols' erased the memory of Georgians, not on1y of the negative moments in the 
newest history of Georgia such as ethnie conflicts and poverty, but also crucial moments 
in the history such as the Democratie Republic of Georgia in 1918-21 and the rebellion of 
1924 after the Soviet occupation. 
R6: The fact that they changed the national symbols demonstrates how 
unprofessional they are. The old symbols represented historÎc memory and respect 
for our ancestors and symbols of Georgia's first European-style Republic in 1918. 
These were symbols defended at a cost ofthousands oflives and were cheri shed 
during the Soviet years. 
Several of the respondents did not consider these new symbols to be truly Georgian, as 
, 
the new flag bears a strong resemblance to the flag of the crusaders in the Middle Ages; 
initially, it was the flag of Saakashvili's political party, the "National Movement." 
R3: 1 am a eonservative person so 1 was initially against the changing of national 
symbols. Now 1 think that the anthem is good and people know it by heart. But 1 
don't like the bright colours in the flag, especially the bright red because it is not a 
Georgian traditional color. Our colors were never bright, they are darker like 
brown and dark blue. r have also heard that this new flag is not Georgian at aIl. In 
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fact nobody knows what it is and where it cornes from. It is confusing to have 
national symbols that are unknown to you. 
As respondents noted, national symbols have been actively flagged and publicized since 
the Rose Revolution, both in media and everyday life. A video on the new national 
anthem, featuring famous Georgian public figures, was regularly broadcast on several 
Georgian channels and the Georgian flag was and still is omnipresent in every big and 
small city throughout Georgia. Since the Rose Revolution it has ev en become 
fashionable to wear t-shirts with the flag on it or to paint the flag on your face when there 
is an occasion do so, and even creating new musical arrangements for the national 
anthem. 
RII: National symbols and especially the flag is literally everywhere, Tbilisi is 
full of it on every corner even on garbage bins. The anthem is played 200 times a 
day on TV, so yes you learn it by heart. l think it is too much butI guess this is 
the way they are trying to promote patriotism. 
The regime of Shevardnadze was highly criticized by citizens of Georgia for neglecting 
national symbols and" not valuing them: the only times national symbols were invoked 
were either during ethnic conflicts or soccer games, both always ending in defeat. Soccer 
was indeed a national sport in Georgia before the Rose Revolution, despite the fact that 
none of the soccer players of the Georgian national team actually knew the words to the 
Georgian anthem. But as interviewees have noted situation has changed and children are 
taught the national anthem at schools and every Monday in each school the flag is raised 
and the anthem is sung by the students. Aiso gaining in popularity are patriotic camps, 
where teenagers are taught how to be better patriots of Georgia. While for sorne 
respondents of the oIder generation (R6 and R3), these camps are reminiscent of the 
Soviet era pioneer camps, although this time it is Georgia and not the Soviet UnÏon that is 
glorified. 
While sorne of the respondents (RI, R7, R9) from the younger age group and 
representatives of ethnic minorities praise the new symbols as the fresh start for Georgia, 
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Georgian origin respondents from the older age groupe R2,R3 and R6) see the change o( 
symbols as disrespectful ofthose who fought for the independence of Georgia. Finally, 
the third group (R5 and RIO) do not accord any particular importance to the change of' 
symbols. 
4.2.3. National pride 
Alongside popularizing national syrnbols, the biggest change noted by respondents was 
the rediscovery of national pride after the Rose Revolution, although reasons ofthis 
particular rediscovery were articulated differently. Sorne of the respondents argued that 
the Rose Revolution had brought back the faith in Georgian state, while others argued 
that national pride was generated by the fear of criticizing Saakashvili's government that 
is always portrayed as ideal and efficient. 
After the independence in 1991, Georgia was marked by two ethnic conflicts, civil war, 
poverty, high rates ofunemployment and shortages of electricity. In these circumstances, 
national pride lost its meaning. Arnong the goals of the new government were the 
reaffirrnation of Georgian statehood and the restoration of trust towards government. As 
sorne of the respondents noted, the attitude towards the government is changing in a 
positive direction, in contrast to the Shevardnadze regime that was defined by the public 
mistrust. 
Ri: The attitude towards the governrnent has changed and 1 like it. After the war, 
the overall attitude ofpeople was nihilistic. Now our government tries to 
popularize our values and this is do ne in order to raise the self-respect of our 
nation. Sometimes it goes to extremes, for exarnple when Misha makes his usual 
speeches he always mentions that we Georgians are a great nation and we are 
rebuilding our country and everyone must take part in this process. 1 think this 
really matters for people and now it is actually cool to be Georgian! 
While sorne praise Saakashvili's patriotic populism, others fair that he will repeat the 
mistakes made by the first president of Georgia, Zviad Garnsakhurdia. At first 
Garnsakhurdia managed to reunite Georgians and seek independence from the Soviet 
Union, but he later largely contributed towards the division of the nation that manifested 
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into civil war and ethnic conflicts. Like Saakashvili, when Gamsakhurdia became a 
popular hero and leader of the liberation movement, his popularity in western Georgia 
"bordered the cult of adulation" (Jones, 2005: 39). 
R4: 1 think Saakashvili is sorne sort of caricature of Gamsakhurdia with his 
populist propaganda. At first during the demonstrations when emotions were 
overflowing, 1 thought many things would change but now 1 understand that the 
reality is different. Yes, we are really trying to be a more respectable country, the 
new government says we already are, but 1 doubt it. 1 think it is more of an 
illusion that they created, differently from the old government that could not have 
cared less. 
One of the biggest concerns of the new government has been the rehabilitation of 
Georgia's image abroad. Before the Rose Revolution Georgia was little known to the 
international community and the only media attention it received concerned ethnic 
conflicts and Russian allegations of Georgia providing asylum to Chechen terrorists. 
Sorne of the respondents argue that the situation has changed since the Rose Revolution. 
With this being first major political crisis resolved peacefully, Georgia has become a 
model of peaceful revolution, acquiring much-needed worldwide positive media coverage 
and achieving a positive image in the international community. 
RIO: Before the Rose Revolution nobody respected Georgia, nobody ev en knew 
Georgia existed. If before you were ashamed to be Georgian, now people regained 
the hope and pride in our country and others respect us. Now you can say how 
beautiful Georgia is and there is no other place like this. Tbilisi is beautiful city 
and at last we have normal roads. 
R9: People really got their faith back. They move forward, they faU down but they 
eventually stand up, and now they know that there is a solution to this dreadful 
situation. Everything was grey before, now it is bright and radiant! It is absolutely 
normal for people to be proud oftheir government and this is the first time we 
, have this opportunity. 
Respondents mentioned above credit the Rose Revolution in generating national pride 
that was non existent in the post-Soviet Georgia. In a divergingview, however, R3 
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university professor of Georgian origin expressed an opinion that national pride is 
confused with the fear to criticize government of Saakashvili that is always portrayed as 
efficient and progressive. 
R3: l think today's situation in Georgia resembles somewhat what was happening 
in the Soviet Union in 1937 marked by large scale repressions. Of course this 
comparison might seem bit exaggerated, but people are afraid to speak their 
minds about everything that concems government. And this absence of critique is 
confused with national pride. l don't think in three years from the Rose 
Revolution so many things have changed that now we can be proud and happy. 
Major changes need more time than that and the problems that Georgia faces can 
not be solved that easily. What l am trying to say is that the govemment is 
eliminating any possible source of critique and Rustavi 2 plays a key role in it, by 
broadcasting incriminating phone conversations of the people who dare to 
criticize Saakashvili and his entourage. l guess if they listened to what l say now l 
would have problems too. 
It is rather interesting to note that sorne of the respondents mainly from ethnic minorities 
- two of them Azeri (R8, R9) and one Ukrainian (RII) - indeed abstained from making 
explicit critical comments about the govemment. For instance RII requested her 
interviews not to be tape recorded as she feared govemment might have accessed the 
tapes where she would criticize them. It seems rather ironie that the govemment that 
came to power after the Rose Revolution and promised much needed democratic changes 
instead uses media as a tool for silencing critical voices. Current policy of the new 
government is inconsistent with the values that they were initially promoting. 
Overall conceming national pride, among interviewees, representatives of ethnic 
minorities (RIO, R8, R7) and younger Georgians (RI) believe that the situation has 
indeed changed and there are reasons to be proud oftheir country. Respondent R4, who is 
an ethnic Georgian, however, indicated that national pride is generated more by the 
illusion,created by the govemment and not by actual changes. Finally, R3 who is ethnic 
Georgian university professor sees the emergence of national pride as generated by the 
fear to criticize the government. 
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4.3. Unity 
ln this part of my analysis, 1 will discuss how i~terviewees of Georgian and different 
ethnic backgrounds have negotiated a discourse on the unit y of the Georgian people. 1 am 
particularly interested how informants defined Georgian-ness and the elements associated 
with it, in addition to how categories of exclusi.on and inclusion have been created and 
. how they differ from those disseminated by the media during the Rose Revolution. 
Finally, 1 would like to explore whether or not the post-Rose Revolution national identity 
has bec orne inclusive of Georgia's multiethnic nature. 
4.3.1. Discussion of Georgian-ness 
ln the discourse on unit y of the Georgian national identity disseminated in the media 
during and after the Rose Revolution, visions of unit Y were largely flagged through 
Christianity, viewed as an integral part of the Georgian national identity. 1 was interested 
to discover the position of interviewees towards this issue. Several of the ethnic Georgian 
interviewees (RI, R2, R3 and R4) see Christianity as an integral part of Georgian national 
identity. 
RI: For us religion and the independence of Georgia have been closely 
interrelated since ancient times. Christianity was a state religion in the Georgian 
Kingdom and was a unifying force stronger than anything else: for the unity of 
Georgians and for maintaining our culture, Christianity is crucial. It is part of 
being Georgian, like a guide for living in Georgia. The way 1 see it, there is a 
spirituallink between being Georgian and being Christian Orthodox. 
R2: For me, being Georgian and being Christian orthodox are identical concepts. 
From ancient times Christianity has saved Georgia. People were given faith and 
this gave them the desire to defend their country. Queen Tamar led her army with 
the cross is her hands and this reinforced love for the homeland. The national 
, identity cannot change, it cornes from ancient times and it is unique and 
Christianity is integral part of it. 
However, not aIl Georgian interviewees believe that Christianity is the essential part of 
Georgian nationalidentity. 
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R5: 1 don't know why people say that being Georgian and being Christian 
Orthodox is the same thing. 1 think it is wrong and 1 don't understand it. Sorne 
pseudo-patriots even claim that you betray your country if you are not Christian 
Orthodox. 1 don't know how people can believe in it?! For example many great 
Georgians were not Christian Orthodox so know we should hate them for it?! 1 
guess people that say things like that are extremely uneducated. 
As the link between being Georgian and being Christian Orthodox is so largely 
emphasized in everyday life that the representatives of ethnic minorities who are truly 
willing to integrate into Georgian society recognizeChristianity as the integral part of 
Georgian lifestyle. For example, R8 is 60 year old Geography teacher of Azeri origin 
fluent in Georgian, born and raised in Tbilisi and is practising Muslim but occasionally 
attends Orthodox Church. 
R8: Our family lives according to the Georgian traditions. Azeri traditions are not 
bad either, but we have to adapt to the culture of the country where we live. 1 
don't want somebody judging me because of the way 1 talk, dress or act in 
society. 1 have tried to get closer to Georgian culture. 1 go to mosque and 1 go to 
Church. My church is Sioni and when 1 go there, 1 light two candies and ask God 
for prosperity and peace in Georgia. Nowhere it is written that the Azeri and 
Georgian Gods are different. If 1 go to mosque once 1 will go to church twice, so 
what if 1 am Azeri?! 
From R8's account, we can see that going to church for her is not as much religious 
practice as cultural and social part of the life. For this respondent, who is willing to 
integrate into Georgian society and does not want to be perceived by Georgians as the 
"other" going to church as ordinary Georgians do is a sort of social practice that helps to 
. build an understanding of the nature of Georgian national identity; At the same time, this 
practice overcomes an obstacle to inclusion into Georgian society. In being excluded and 
tagged as "other" primarily because ofher religion, the Muslim respondent quoted above 
has chosen to transform going to church into a social and cultural practice that allows her 
the opportunity to smoothly integrate into Georgian society by doing something that 
according to her every Georgian does: going to church. 
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Another element prominently invoked alongside Christianity as an integral part of 
Georgian national identity by the interviewees has been Georgian culture. 
R5: 1 think it is our culture that defines what it is to be Georgian. Government 
tradition was always weak ~n Georgia so the only thing that was powerful and 
original has been our culture. It is very important to us; 1 guess this is the only 
thing with which we actually succeeded and makes us proud. Religion is purely 
spiritual but culture is a larger part of life, you live in it and experience it every 
day. 
Oddly enough most of the respondents inc1uding representatives of ethnie minorities, 
sorne of them not Christian, named Christianity as a defining element of Georgian 
national identity. For instance, R5 and R6 argued in favour of Georgian culture as the 
most important element around Georgian national identity. 
4.3.2. Multiethnic reality 
In this section 1 shaH discuss whether or not the multiethnie reality of Georgia is 
recognized and aècepted by the interviewees in everyday practices. 1 will also discuss the 
question of whether the post-Rose Revolution national identity has embraced its 
multiethnic nature. White doing a critical discourse analysis of the Rustavi 2 media 
archive, 1 was astonished to discover that throughout the coverage of the Rose Revolution 
no information was provided on the participation of ethnic minorities or their position on 
what was happening during the events. Therefore, 1 was interested to discover how 
interviewees both Georgian and of ethnic origin reflected on this issue. 
One of the respondents of Armenian origin (RIO) noted that participation in the events of 
the Rose Revolution by representatives of ethnic minorities was an individual choice. 
These people did not go to the demonstration as a community but rather as individuals. 
Many of the respondents, both ethnic Georgians and representatives of ethnic minorities, 
expressed an opinion that the passivity of ethnic minorities during the Rose Revolution 
was connected to the fact that they were not fully integrated into Georgian society due to 
many factors, one ofthem being absence ofknowledge of the Georgian language. 
96 
R4: Ethnic minorities are not integrated, that's why they can not participate in 
events like the Rose Revolution. For example, the Azeri community in Mameuli 13 
is better informed on what is happening in Azerbaijan than in Georgia. 1 don't 
think the Government does much to integrate them more fully. Of course, the 
biggest problem is the language as they don't speak Georgian. 
The language barrier is indeed a major, as in regions with large national minority groups 
such as Marneuli with predominant Azeri and Axalqalaqi with predominant Armenian 
population. In these regions Georgian language is not spoken at aIl as these people 
communicate in Armenian, Azeri or Russian and as the result are isolated from the rest of 
the Georgia. 
R5: We did not create any conditions to integrate national minorities. It is not 
their fault that they don't know Georgian. Many so-called "patriotic" Georgians 
think this problem can be resolved violently, but in reality the government has to 
take more serious steps to finally integrate these people and replace the Russian 
language with Georgian. 1 know it is a painful process but Georgians are 
responsible for teaching ethnic minorities our language. 
Representatives of ethnic minorities whom 1 have interviewed recognized that Georgia is 
not ready to embrace its multiethnic nature, although sorne attempts were made after the 
Rose Revolution. As R7, a lawyer of Armenian origin explains, the first step in 
integration has to be teaching ethnic minorities Georgian. 
R7: 1 guess overall the situation remains the same, but at least now sorne attempts 
are made to improve the situation. But there are major problems like that the 
Armenian Church does not have juridical status in Georgia. Let's alleviate this 
problem and Armenians will be the first to support the Georgians. Georgians gave 
homes to our ancestors escaping Turkish genocide, and we remember this and we 
are grateful. 1 have ajob because 1 know Georgian and in Tbilisi 1 had a 
. possibility to learn it, but people in the regions don't have this possibility right 
now. We are ready to be integrated into this society but we should be taught 
~m~~ \ 
13 Mameuli is the city with the biggest population of Azeri origin. 
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The Armenian community is the large st minority and the most talked about in Georgia. 
As one of the Georgian respondents (R4) suggested, the attitude towards Armenians and 
difficulties in integration are historie. 
R4: 1 guess the Armenian national identity is too strong and it threatens Georgians ' 
- that's why we have problems recognizing them as full citizens and always 
thinking of them as visitors. 1 doubt somebody with Armenian origin would be 
capable of having a political career here, as no matter what the government says, 
people will always see them as a threat. 
Members of the Armenian community have suggested that this negative attitude towards 
Armenians has been created and reinforced by Georgian media, which presents 
Armenians as anti -Georgian. 
R7: Newspapers often write that Armenians fought against Georgians in 
Abkhazia. 1 suppose sorne individuals really did, but not all Armenians in general. 
1 am a human being first and then 1 am an Armenian. 
Several of the ethnie Georgians respondents (RI, R2, R3) interviewed, in contrast to the 
representatives of ethnie minorities, believe that ethnie minorities already are perfectly 
integrated into Georgian society and that these issues are brought up constantly after the 
Rose Revolution because this is what the international community wants to hear. 
RI: Personally, 1 think that there are no ethnie minority problems in Georgia at 
aIl. We are known to be a tolerant nation. At least all of the people around me are 
like that. Look what is happening in Russia now - that would have never have 
happened here. There are no skinheads or radical nationalists in Georgia at all and 
ev en ifthey existed nobody would have taken them seriously. 1 mean all this 
discrimination is not true, for example have you ever heard of an Armenian being 
discriminated against in Georgia?! 1 certainly haven't. 
While sorne of the Georgian respondents argue (RI) that ethnie minorities are perfectly 
integrated, respondent R2 who is Georgian linguist argues that integration should happen 
through the assimilation and demands from ethnie minorities to renounce their cultural 
heritage and adhere to Georgian one. 
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R2: We can talk as much as we want but for majority of ethnie minorities 
Georgia does not mean anything. They just don't care about our country. They 
need Georgia when everything is good here, but once problems begin the y just 
leave. Only Georgians really care about our country. 1 don't trust members of .' 
ethnie minorities that are not assimilated, because the y don't consider Georgia as 
their homeland. So if they really want to integrate than they should assimilate. At 
this point this is the only solution, maybe in couple of years this will change and 
ethnie minorities will love Georgia without assimilation but now it is impossible. 
R2's opinion on ethnie minorities was not shared by other respondents. However, sorne 
of ethnie Georgian respondents (RI, R3) and Azeri respondents (R8, R9) denied any 
serious issues with the Integration of ethnie minorities. Others mentioned problems such 
as language barrier and cultural differences (R7, R4). Finally, one of the Georgian 
respondents (R6) noted that Georgia is defined by its multiethnic minority although the 
majority of pèople have problems recognizing this. 
R6: Ifwe go back to the sources'ofGeorgian nation we can see that it emerged 
from two completely different ethnie groups- Kolhis and Iberis- so from the 
beginning Georgia was multiethnic. As far as 1 am concemed, Georgia can exist 
only as the multiethnic state and it would be good ifthe news govemment tried to 
embrace this nature of Georgia. 
Overall, majority of interviewees from different ethnie backgrounds, age groups and 
occupations (R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, RIO, RII) recognized difficulties associated with the 
Integration of ethnie minorities. Part of the respondents RI who is Georgian and R8, R9 
who are Azeri dismissed any problems recognizing Georgia's multiethnic reality. In 
contrast, R2 who is ethnie Georgian expressed an opinion that integration is impossible 
without assimilation. From above we can create a picture that many respondents realize 
the importance of ethnie minority Integration however not much has been do ne to address 
the situation, while media completely ignores these issues and ev en sometimes 
aggravates the situation as R7 noted. As ethnie minorities were excludedfrom the Rose 
Revolution coverage, their voices were and unfortunately still are silenced in the media 
and political dise ourse around Georgian national identity. Due to this discursive 
exclusion problems of Integration are not addressed and even silenced. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
The'semi-structured interviews analyzed in this chapter provided a different type of 
qualitative data from the critical discourse analysis of the Rustavi 2 media archive. The 
interviews provided more personal definitions of the Rose Revolution and analysis of the 
roie of Rustavi 2 within these events. Most importantly, commentaries on the respondents 
1 
were made three years after the Rose Revolution. This time gap was crucial as the vision 
of the Rose Revolution and Rustavi 2 after three years was redefined for several 
respondents. 
In the first part of this chapter the opinions expressed by the respondents were highly 
influenced by the age, occupation and ethnic origin. For instance younger respondents 
were more positive towa'rds Rustavi 2, but they still brought up propaganda and visual 
manipulation in their discussions. Glder respondents on the contrary were highly critical 
of Rustavi 2' s coverage, blaming the channel for staging the revolution. Meanwhile the 
majority of the representatives of ethnie minorities praised Rustavi 2's coverage for being 
truthful. These patterns of similarities and differences might be explained by the 
professional background and age of the interviewees. Three of the younger respondents 
were in the media field, whereas oIder respondents work almost exdusively in the 
education sector, part ofthem being university professors and the rest school teachers. 
( 
ln the second part ofthis chapter l discussed the changes actively flagged by the media 
and introduced after the Rose Revolution. Among discussed issues were: European 
integration, introduction ofthe'new national symbols and the rise of the national pride. 
Patterns in the interviews were similar to those in the first part of this chapter, except for 
the questions of European integration where aH the respondents expressed similar 
, opinions. In the rest ofthe questions concerning national syrnbols and rise of national 
pride, younger respondents of both Georgian and ethnic origins described thern 
positively; In contrast older respondents expressed negative opinions conceming these 
Issues. 
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The third part of this chapter was dedicated to the discussion of Georgian-ness and the 
multiethnic reality of Georgia. Majority of the respondents invoked 'Christianity and 
Georgian culture as the main components of the Georgian national identity, the same 
elements that were flagged in the discourse disseminated on Rustavi 2. Regardless their 
ethic origin, age and occupation most of the respondents in exception of two respondents 
(RI, R2) recognized difficulties associated with acceptance of Georgia's multiethnic 
reality alongside integration of ethnic minorities. 
Finally, interviews enriched more general data provided by critical discourse analysis of 
the Rustavi 2 media archive that did not include opinions of the ordinary Georgians. 
Although data obtained by the interviews is only exploratory it still pro vides an insight 
into the post-Rose Revolution situation regarding reconstruction of the national identity. 
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5. Conclusion 
ln this research, 1 have explored how Georgian national identity was reshaped within 
discourse through the participation of the media (notably TV channel Rustavi 2) after the 
Rose Revolution that took place in November 2003. Within this research, 1 have 
ide~tified and analyzed dominant discourses on the post-Rose Revolution Georgian 
national identity which were mobilized and disseminated by the media. These discourses 
included transition from "old" to "new" Georgia, introduction of the new national 
symbols, post-Rose Revolution political narratives, unit y, Christianity and Georgian 
culture. While analyzing these discourses 1 have also identified discursive "gap" in the 
media coverage conceming the participation of ethnic minorities in the Rose Revolution. 
The first part ofmy research was dedicated to the critical discourse analysis of the Rose 
Revolution media coverage on the key dates ofNovember 22nd_23 rd 2003. This particular 
analysis was multidimensional and mediated connection between language, everyday 
practices, social, political, cultural and historical contexts (Fairclough, 1995). Although, 
media occupied an important place in this research 1 chose not to concentrate solely on 
the media and include everyday practices that continually shape national identity together 
with the media. 
ln the second part of my research 1 have explored on a small sample of Il interviewees 
with different ethnic backgrounds, how the y interiorized and negotiated dominant 
discourses on Georgian national identity disseminated and flagged by the media during 
the Rose Revolution. This part of my research was dedicated to personal perspectives on 
the Rose Revolution and discussion of the Georgian national identity three years after the 
events ofNovember 2003. Differently from the formaI portrayal of the Georgian national 
identify flagged in the media, interviewees discussed their personal perceptions of the 
Rose Revolution and Georgian national identity in general and changes noticed in 
everyday practices. 
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As this research was centered on a study of both media and everyday practices that 
influenced discursive reconstruction of Georgian national. identity after the Rose 
Revolution l chose to integrate elements of Michael Billig's Banal Nationalism and 
flagging homeland that argues that national identity is em bedded within everyday 
routines (Billig: 1995). To coyer both everyday practices and media in the complex 
process of Georgian national identity reconstruction after the Rose Revolution l chose to 
combine two metliodological approaches, critical discourse analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. The critical discourse analysis of a media archive was set out to identify and 
analyze dominant discourses on Georgian national identity disseminated by Rustavi 2; 
this coverage, as largue, provided an official vision of the post-Rose Revolution national 
identity. Interviews on the contrary, provided qualitative personal insights into the post-
Rose Revolution national identity and gave me an opportunity to question Georgian 
national identity and the role of Rustavi 2 three years after these events. 
Although, many studies have been conducted on national identity and the media (Billig, 
1995; Edensor, 2002; Schlesinger, 1991; Morley & Robins, 1995; Higgins, 2004; 
Brookes,1999; Barker,1999, 1997; Erjavec, 2003;) none ofthem have studied media led 
peaceful Revolutions like the Rose Revolution. As the Rose Revolution is a relatively 
new phenomenon and has not received significant scientific attention, this exploratory 
research will help to c1arify sorne aspects of the peaceful media-fuelled revolution in a 
post-Soviet country. Although as mentioned above, this research is exploratory and was 
conducted on a very sm aIl sample it still provides an interesting discussion of the link 
between media and peaceful revolutions that happened in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kirgizstan and were initially seen as a significant step towards the adoption of the 
democratic values in the newly democratic post-Soviet countries. 
In the case of Georgia, aspirations associated with the Rose Revolution that proved to be 
an exclusively non.,violent and powerful event, were severely damaged in November 
2007 when the government thàt came after the Rose Revolution violently dispersed 
peaceful demonstration of the opposition supporters. Recognizing the force of the media, 
the government c10sed Imedi TV that supported opposition forces and on regular basis 
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hroadcasted statements of the opposition leaders. In fact the government that came with 
the promise of democratic changes threatened the freedom of speech with closure of 
lmedi TV and brutally ended peaceful demonstration. After the events ofNovember 2007 
success story of Georgian Democracy was reviewed in different light: 
As this research has exploratory character, 1 was unable to make broad conclusions on the 
Rose Revolution and the media participation within these events. However, this research 
sheds light on discourses surrounding the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and opens the 
door for the future researches oriented towards better understanding phenomenon of the 
media led peaceful revolutions that took place in 2000-2005 in post-Socialist and post-
Communist countries like Serbia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. 
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Annex 1 
List of respondents 
Respondent 
Gender Age Occupation Ethnie origin 
R] Female 23 Joumalist Ethnie Georgian 
R2 Female 59 Linguist Ethnie Georgian 
R3 Female 5] University Ethnie Georgian 
Professor 
R4 Female 22 Student III Ethnie Georgian 
Joumalism 
R5 Male 39 History Ethnie Georgian 
Teaeher 
R6 Male 52 University Ethnie Georgian 
Professor 
R7 Male 25 Lawyer Armenian -
R8 Female 60 Teacher Azeri 
R9 Female 3] Teacher Azeri!'! 
RlO Female 23 Graduate Armenian 
Student III 
Media Studies 
RI] Female 60 Chemist Ukrainianl:l 
14 This interview was conducted in Georgian, although respondent had difficulties but declined to switch to 
Russian. 
15 Interview was conducted entirely in Russian and interviewee requested our conversation not to be tape 
recorded. 
] ] 2 
Annex 2 
Key dates in Georgian history 
11-13 centuries A.D. - the Golden Age of Georgian Kingdom 
1801 - Occupation of the Georgian Kingdom by the Russian Tsarist Empire 
1918-1921 - Restoration of the Georgian independence - First Georgian Democratie 
Republic 
1921 - Boishevik Russian Occupation 
1922 - Foundation of the Soviet Union and incorporation of Georgia as a Soviet 
Socialist Republic 
1987 -1988 - Rise of Georgian National Liberation Movement 
April 9th 1989 - Attack of the Soviet Army against peaceful demonstrators on Tbilisi, 
Georgia 
1991 - Second Restoration of the Georgian lndependence 
Key Dates of the Rose Revolution 
November 2nd 2003 - Parliamentary Elections 
November 21 st 2003 - First large scale demonstration demanding resignation of 
Eduard Shevardnadze held in the capital Tbilisi 
November 22nd 2003 - Storming of Parliament by the Opposition Forces 
November 23 rd 2003 - Culmination of the Rose Revolution 
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Annex 3 
TV networks and newspapers operating in Georgia in November 2003 
TV networks 
Rustavi 2 - private TV network presenting openly pro- opposition coverage of the Rose 
Revolution 
1 st Channel - now Public Broadcasting of Georgia presenting openly pro- governrnent 
coverage of the Rose Revolution 
Imedi - newly established private TV network presenting neutral coverage 6fthe Rose 
Revolution 
Mze - private regional TV network broadcasting only in the capital Tbilisi presenting 
neutral coverage of the Rose Revolution 
Kavkasia - private regional TV network broadcasting only in Tbilisi 
Iberia - private regional TV network broadcasting only in Tbilisi presenting pro-
governrnent coverage of the Rose Revolution 
The Press 
24 Saati - private daily national newspaper belonging to the same media conglomerate as 
TV station Rustavi 2 
Sakartvelos Respublica - pro-governrnent daily national newspaper 
Akhali Versia - private weekly national newspaper 
Rezonansi - private national daily newspaper 
K "iris Palitra - private weekly national newspaper 
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